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1. Introduction	  
Uncertainty	  and	  turbulence	  is	  a	  perennial	  feature	  of	  the	  context	  within	  which	  cities	  must	  plan	  but	  there	  
are	  time	  periods	  in	  which	  a	  sense	  of	  uncertainty	  is	  heightened.	  This	  has	  been	  the	  case	  in	  the	  period	  
since	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis	  of	  2007/08	  where	  the	  experience	  of	  uncertainty	  has	  reached	  levels	  not	  
known	  since	  the	  Great	  Depression	  of	  the	  1930s.	  The	  Financial	  Crisis	  was	  an	  ‘uncertainty	  shock’	  but	  it	  has	  
left	  tremors	  in	  its	  aftermath.	  As	  one	  commentator	  put	  it,	  the	  recovery	  from	  the	  crisis	  has	  been	  
“anaemic,	  brittle	  and	  fraught	  with	  uncertainty”	  (Tyson	  2015).	  The	  combination	  of	  economic	  uncertainty	  
in	  the	  contemporary	  period	  with	  political	  turbulence,	  global	  terrorism,	  and	  anxieties	  over	  climate	  
change	  has	  created	  a	  ‘perfect	  storm’	  of	  uncertainty.	  
Wiltbank	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  write	  that	  “unknowability	  (true	  unpredictability)	  can	  be	  a	  disquieting	  and	  
disruptive	  phenomenon.”	  This	  is	  especially	  so	  for	  the	  activity	  we	  call	  ‘planning’	  which,	  almost	  by	  
definition,	  requires	  some	  degree	  of	  confidence	  in	  our	  expectations	  for	  the	  future.	  The	  legitimacy	  of	  
planning	  depends	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  is	  can	  handle	  radical	  uncertainty.	  While	  the	  more	  traditional	  
forms	  of	  planning	  may	  be	  helpless	  in	  the	  face	  of	  this	  uncertainty,	  there	  are,	  fortunately,	  approaches	  to	  
planning	  within	  contexts	  of	  uncertainty	  that	  have	  evolved	  in	  both	  corporate	  and	  public	  sector	  planning	  
practice	  since	  at	  least	  the	  late	  1960s.	  
In	  this	  paper	  we	  begin	  by	  outlining	  some	  of	  the	  dimensions	  of	  uncertainty,	  both	  globally	  and	  for	  the	  
context	  of	  Johannesburg,	  focussing	  on	  aspects	  relating	  to	  demography,	  environmental	  threats,	  
economy,	  society	  and	  politics,	  acknowledging,	  of	  course,	  that	  these	  are	  all	  profoundly	  interrelated.	  We	  
then	  explore	  the	  multifaceted	  literature	  on	  planning	  for	  uncertainty,	  using	  the	  framework	  provided	  by	  
Wiltbank	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  which	  distinguishes	  between	  approaches	  which	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  better	  
positioning	  of	  an	  institution	  within	  an	  uncertain	  environment,	  and	  those	  which	  actively	  attempt	  to	  
shape	  environments.	  We	  apply	  the	  useful	  elements	  of	  the	  varying	  approaches	  to	  a	  brief	  analysis	  of	  
Johannesburg’s	  current	  Growth	  and	  Development	  Strategy	  (GDS)	  exploring	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  GDS	  
has	  successfully	  accommodated	  uncertainty.	  We	  conclude	  with	  recommendations	  on	  how	  a	  new	  or	  
revised	  GDS	  may	  better	  respond	  to	  uncertainty.	  
Our	  approach	  to	  this	  study	  is	  broadly	  informed	  by	  a	  key	  insight	  offered	  by	  Peter	  Drucker	  in	  his	  seminal	  
piece,	  ‘Planning	  for	  Uncertainty’	  published	  in	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  in	  1992.	  Drucker	  asked	  the	  
question	  “What	  must	  we	  do––in	  fact,	  what	  must	  we	  become––if	  we	  are	  to	  successfully	  navigate	  the	  
treacherous	  waters	  of	  unpredictability?”	  He	  argues,	  with	  reference	  to	  corporate	  planning	  but	  with	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relevance	  to	  public	  sector	  planning,	  that	  traditional	  approaches	  to	  dealing	  with	  uncertainty	  are	  not	  
helpful:	  
Uncertainty––in	  the	  economy,	  society,	  politics––has	  become	  so	  great	  as	  to	  render	  futile,	  if	  not	  
counterproductive,	  the	  kind	  of	  planning	  most	  companies	  still	  practice:	  forecasting	  based	  on	  
probabilities.	  (Drucker	  1992)	  
Drucker	  suggests	  an	  alternative	  approach	  to	  thinking	  about	  the	  future.	  Instead	  of	  asking	  “what	  is	  most	  
likely	  to	  happen?"	  planning	  for	  uncertainty	  asks,	  instead,	  “what	  has	  already	  happened	  that	  will	  create	  
the	  future?”	  This	  is	  the	  approach	  we	  take	  below	  in	  outlining	  dimensions	  of	  uncertainty.	  Our	  analysis	  is	  
not	  futuristic	  and	  speculative	  but	  rather	  asks	  what	  the	  existing	  or	  emergent	  trends,	  and	  identified	  risks,	  
are	  and	  what	  this	  may	  mean	  for	  the	  future.	  The	  reality,	  of	  course,	  is	  that	  the	  future	  is	  thoroughly	  
unpredictable	  and	  we	  can	  only	  present	  these	  dimensions	  as	  illustrative	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  
not	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  any	  form	  of	  projection.	  More	  important,	  appreciating	  these	  sorts	  of	  uncertainties,	  is	  
how	  we	  can	  proceed	  with	  non-­‐predictive	  forms	  of	  planning.	  A	  critical	  question	  that	  will	  address	  further	  
in	  the	  text	  is	  whether	  our	  planning	  should	  focus	  only	  on	  adapting	  to	  uncertainty,	  or	  whether	  it	  should	  
actively	  seek	  to	  shape	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  uncertainty.	  
We	  do	  not	  assume	  that	  uncertainty	  is	  necessarily	  negative.	  In	  the	  corporate	  literature,	  at	  least,	  there	  is	  a	  
strong	  recognition	  that	  uncertainty	  brings	  opportunity.	  This	  is	  arguably	  also	  the	  case	  in	  planning	  for	  the	  
future	  of	  large	  and	  complex	  cities.	  Kaplan	  (2008)	  writes	  that,	  with	  uncertainty	  “often	  the	  basic	  meaning	  
of	  a	  situation	  is	  up	  for	  grabs”.	  With	  uncertainty	  comes	  the	  opportunity	  to	  rewrite	  scripts	  in	  more	  
desirable	  ways.	  However,	  there	  are	  massive	  risks	  if	  trends	  are	  misread	  or	  ignored.	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2. Dimensions	  of	  Uncertainty	  
In	  the	  international	  literature	  on	  future	  uncertainty	  there	  are	  two	  broad	  approaches.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  focus	  
on	  the	  potential	  risks	  and	  the	  second	  is	  to	  identify	  and	  track	  possible	  trends.	  A	  ‘risk’	  is	  the	  perceived	  
likelihood	  of	  a	  future	  event	  or	  a	  condition	  that	  generally	  has	  a	  negative	  outcome	  while	  a	  ‘trend’	  is	  a	  
longer	  term	  pattern	  with	  negative,	  positive	  or	  mixed	  outcomes.	  2.1	  Risk	  
In	  this	  section	  of	  the	  report	  we	  deal	  mainly	  with	  uncertainties	  around	  trends,	  but	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
acknowledge	  the	  significance	  of	  risk	  in	  planning.	  The	  challenge	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  objective	  way	  of	  
specifying	  risk,	  and	  what	  is	  perceived	  as	  being	  a	  risk	  changes	  over	  time.	  The	  World	  Economic	  Forum	  
(WEF)	  tries	  to	  respond	  to	  this	  with	  an	  annual	  Global	  Risks	  Report	  which	  is	  developed	  through	  interviews	  
with	  experts	  and	  leaders	  globally.	  
The	  WEF	  distinguishes	  between	  perceived	  risks	  for	  the	  immediate	  future	  and	  perceived	  risk	  for	  the	  
longer	  term.	  In	  its	  2016	  report,	  for	  example,	  it	  identifies	  the	  immediate	  causes	  of	  uncertainty	  globally	  as	  
being	  focussed	  around:	  
• Large	  scale	  involuntary	  migration,	  
• State	  collapse	  or	  crisis,	  
• Interstate	  conflict.	  
• Unemployment,	  and	  
• Failure	  of	  national	  governance.	  
Taking	  a	  longer	  term	  perspective,	  however,	  the	  key	  perceived	  sources	  of	  uncertainty	  are:	  
• Water	  crises,	  
• Failure	  of	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  and	  adaptation,	  
• Extreme	  weather	  events,	  
• Food	  crisis,	  and	  
• Profound	  social	  instability	  (WEF,	  Global	  Risks	  Report	  2016)	  
The	  Economist	  has	  a	  Risk	  Assessment	  Unit	  which	  produces	  monthly	  bulletins	  on	  global	  market	  risk,	  
including	  assessments	  of	  impact	  and	  probability.	  As	  an	  illustration,	  the	  Top	  Risks	  for	  May	  2016	  were:	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1. China	  experiencing	  a	  hard	  economic	  landing	  (high	  probability,	  high	  impact)	  
2. Currency	  volatility	  culminating	  in	  an	  emerging	  markets	  corporate	  debt	  crisis	  (high	  probability,	  
high	  impact)	  
3. Beset	  by	  internal	  and	  external	  pressures,	  the	  European	  Union	  begins	  to	  fragment	  (moderate	  
probability,	  very	  high	  impact)	  
4. “Grexit”	  (Greek	  withdrawl	  from	  the	  Eurozone)	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  Euro	  breakup	  (moderate	  
probability,	  very	  high	  impact)	  
5. Donald	  Trump	  wins	  the	  US	  Presidential	  elections	  (moderate	  probability,	  high	  impact)	  
6. The	  rising	  threat	  of	  jihadi	  terrorism	  destabilises	  the	  global	  economy	  (moderate	  probability,	  high	  
impact)	  
7. Global	  growth	  surges	  in	  2017	  as	  emerging	  markets	  rally	  (low	  probability,	  very	  high	  impact)	  
8. The	  UK	  votes	  to	  leave	  the	  EU	  (low	  probability,	  high	  impact)	  
9. Chinese	  expansionism	  prompts	  a	  clash	  of	  arms	  in	  the	  South	  China	  Sea	  (low	  probability,	  high	  
impact)	  
10. A	  collapse	  in	  investment	  in	  the	  oil	  sector	  prompts	  a	  future	  oil	  price	  shock	  (very	  low	  probability,	  
high	  impact)	  (The	  Economist	  Intelligence	  Unit	  2016)	  
These	  are	  global	  risks	  (as	  perceived	  by	  a	  particular	  agency)	  but	  a	  similar	  analysis	  may	  be	  understand	  for	  
different	  scale,	  including,	  for	  example,	  emerging	  economies,	  Africa,	  South	  Africa,	  and	  Johannesburg.	  
Some	  of	  the	  risks	  may	  be	  shared	  but	  the	  impacts	  may	  be	  very	  different	  across	  scales	  and	  in	  different	  
parts	  of	  the	  world.	  	  
Handling	  risk,	  through	  planning	  for	  uncertainty,	  is	  a	  critical	  theme	  to	  which	  we	  return	  later	  in	  the	  report.	  
We	  shift	  below	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  key	  trends	  which	  we	  address	  in	  the	  interrelated	  themes	  of	  
demography,	  environment,	  economy,	  technology,	  society	  and	  politics.	  2.2	  Demography	  
Demography	  has	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “mother	  of	  all	  trends”	  (What's	  Next	  2016)	  and	  yet	  it	  is	  often	  
oddly	  neglected	  in	  planning	  processes.	  The	  tendency	  is	  often	  to	  assume	  straight-­‐line	  projections	  of	  
current	  trends,	  leading	  to	  often	  serious	  miscalculations.	  While	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  project	  trends	  into	  the	  
far	  future	  there	  are	  existing	  trends	  that	  will	  work	  out	  in	  terms	  of	  consequences	  over	  the	  next	  twenty	  to	  
forty	  years	  at	  least.	  There	  may,	  perhaps,	  be	  less	  uncertainty	  around	  demographics	  than	  other	  areas,	  
including	  economy,	  as	  demographic	  trends	  work	  through	  the	  population	  structure	  over	  a	  relatively	  long	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period,	  but	  the	  demographic	  future	  still	  remains	  uncertain.	  The	  uncertainties	  include	  pandemics,	  
attitudes	  to	  procreation,	  medical	  advances	  or	  setbacks,	  immigration	  policies,	  and	  shifts	  in	  the	  labour	  
market	  (especially	  in	  terms	  of	  female	  employment).	  	  
The	  twentieth	  century	  was	  massively	  shaped	  by	  demographic	  trends.	  This	  was	  a	  century	  in	  which	  world	  
population	  exploded	  from	  1.6	  billion	  to	  6.1	  billion,	  and	  urbanisation	  levels	  increased	  from	  around	  13%	  
to	  45%,	  with	  much	  variation	  in	  different	  places	  across	  the	  globe.	  Other	  major	  shifts	  included	  rising	  life	  
expectancies,	  reduced	  mortality	  rates,	  declining	  fertility	  levels	  in	  wealthier	  countries,	  the	  entry	  of	  
women	  into	  the	  labour	  market,	  the	  youthfulness	  of	  the	  population,	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  nuclear	  family.	  It	  
is	  hard	  to	  overestimate	  the	  impact	  of	  these	  shifts	  on	  the	  lives	  of	  people	  across	  the	  world.	  	  
These	  twentieth	  century	  trends,	  and	  especially	  the	  stories	  of	  rapid	  population	  growth,	  still	  shape	  the	  
perceptions	  of	  policy	  makers.	  There	  is,	  however,	  now	  a	  more	  complex	  picture,	  with	  the	  likelihood	  of	  
quite	  different	  pattern	  in	  the	  twenty	  first	  century.	  The	  Centre	  for	  Global	  Development	  (n.d.)	  put	  it	  like	  
this:	  “the	  population	  story	  is	  no	  longer	  about	  growth	  alone.	  It's	  a	  story	  about	  slower	  growth,	  increasing	  
decline,	  older	  people,	  and	  more	  urban	  living.”	  Although	  there	  is	  recognition	  that	  these	  trends	  are	  
evolving	  at	  a	  different	  pace	  across	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	  even	  in	  the	  poorer	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  
population	  growth	  rates	  are	  on	  a	  declining	  trend,	  after	  peaking	  around	  1970	  (Centre	  for	  Global	  
Development,	  n.d.).	  
Some	  of	  the	  emergent	  (inter-­‐related)	  trends	  currently	  are:	  
• Steadily	  declining	  fertility	  rates,	  
• Delayed	  age	  of	  reproduction,	  
• The	  ageing	  of	  the	  global	  population,	  
• The	  expansion	  of	  single	  person	  households,	  
• The	  decline	  of	  the	  ‘traditional’	  nuclear	  family,	  
• Lower	  marriage	  rates,	  
• Personal	  debt	  delaying	  retirement,	  
• Slowing	  rates	  of	  urbanisation,	  
• More	  racial	  and	  ethnic	  diversity	  in	  cities	  as	  a	  result	  of	  transnational	  migration,	  and	  
• Continued	  increase	  in	  women’s	  role	  in	  the	  labour	  force,	  including	  in	  leadership	  positions.	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The	  combination	  of	  these	  trends	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  massive	  impact	  on	  life	  into	  this	  century	  in	  ways	  that	  
are	  not	  easily	  predictable.	  It	  is	  very	  possible	  that	  trends	  may	  reverse	  or	  shift	  in	  unexpected	  ways.	  There	  
are	  also	  some	  differences	  of	  opinion	  over	  trends––for	  example,	  over	  whether	  the	  trend	  towards	  
increased	  participation	  of	  women	  in	  the	  labour	  market	  will	  continue	  and	  what	  impact	  shifts	  will	  have	  on	  
fertility	  rates.	  	  
It	  is	  impossible	  here	  to	  address	  the	  complexity	  of	  these	  trends	  but	  we	  illustrate	  impacts	  below	  by	  
referring	  to	  the	  specific	  trends	  of	  ageing	  and	  increased	  human	  mobility,	  and	  then	  it’s	  application	  in	  a	  
South	  African-­‐specific	  context.	  
Ageing	  	  
Demographic	  ageing	  is	  happening	  as	  fertility	  rates	  drop,	  largely	  in	  response	  to	  increased	  female	  
education	  and	  participation	  in	  the	  labour	  market,	  and	  as	  life	  expectancy	  continues	  to	  increase.	  In	  2000	  
the	  proportion	  of	  the	  population	  over	  the	  age	  of	  60	  exceeded	  the	  proportion	  of	  children	  for	  countries	  in	  
Europe,	  as	  well	  as	  Russia,	  and	  Japan	  (which	  is	  already	  experiencing	  the	  severe	  effects	  of	  this	  process)	  
(UN	  DESA,	  2015).	  
In	  low	  and	  middle	  income	  countries	  the	  current	  challenge	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  youth	  bulge	  which	  is	  
understandably	  preoccupying	  policy	  makers,	  but	  ageing	  is	  an	  emergent	  trend,	  and	  will	  pose	  a	  challenge	  
in	  the	  future.	  It	  is	  anticipated	  that,	  in	  aggregate,	  in	  these	  countries	  the	  proportion	  of	  plus	  60s	  will	  exceed	  
children	  by	  around	  2045	  (UN	  DESA,	  2015).	  In	  middle	  income	  or	  emerging	  economies	  this	  process	  is	  
happening	  faster	  than	  in	  poorer	  countries.	  It	  is	  happening	  particularly	  fast	  in	  China	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  
one-­‐child	  policies	  but	  also	  in	  countries	  in	  Latin	  America,	  and	  in	  South	  Africa	  (UN	  DESA,	  2015).	  
	  
There	  are	  multiple	  consequences	  to	  this	  trend.	  First,	  growing	  economies	  require	  an	  expanding	  skills	  base	  
which	  will	  be	  in	  short	  supply	  with	  an	  ageing	  population.	  A	  leading	  demographer	  suggested	  that	  “the	  
world	  as	  a	  whole	  won’t	  have	  the	  demographic	  ingredients	  to	  keep	  the	  global	  economy	  humming	  at	  a	  
pre-­‐2008	  tempo”	  (Preston	  2015).	  Secondly,	  there	  are	  the	  burdens	  on	  pension	  funds	  and	  on	  health	  care.	  
Thirdly,	  there	  are	  the	  strains	  that	  an	  ageing	  population	  will	  place	  on	  the	  working	  age	  population	  and	  on	  
individual	  households.	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Although	  the	  general	  trend	  appears	  to	  be	  towards	  demographic	  ageing	  there	  is	  clearly	  variation	  and	  
uncertainty.	  Not	  all	  countries	  are	  equally	  affected	  by	  ageing.	  The	  USA,	  for	  example,	  is	  less	  affected	  by	  
ageing	  than	  other	  OECD	  countries,	  for	  example,	  as	  it	  has	  a	  positive	  fertility	  level	  replacement,	  largely	  
because	  natural	  population	  growth	  is	  augmented	  by	  continued	  in-­‐migration.	  There	  are	  recent	  some	  
indications	  that	  in	  Europe	  fertility	  levels	  have	  recovered	  due	  to	  shifts	  in	  the	  labour	  market	  while	  the	  
decline	  in	  fertility	  levels	  has	  stalled	  in	  parts	  of	  Africa	  where	  conflicts	  and	  other	  factors	  have	  impacted	  
negatively	  on	  development	  (Lutz	  2008)	  (Preston	  2015).	  
Figure1:	  Young	  in	  the	  world:	  Changing	  Proportions	  in	  1980,	  2015	  and	  2050.	  Source:	  UNFPA,	  2014	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Migration	  
Migration	  is	  a	  key	  demographic	  uncertainty	  that	  will	  have	  multiple	  impacts	  on	  other	  trends,	  including	  its	  
potential	  to	  reduce	  the	  trends	  of	  demographic	  ageing.	  The	  impacts	  of	  migration	  are	  complex	  and	  largely	  
depend	  to	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  migration	  is	  managed	  as	  well	  as	  social	  attitudes	  towards	  migration.	  
There	  are	  benefits	  to	  countries	  in	  both	  sending	  and	  receiving	  migration.	  Many	  countries	  which	  are	  net	  
exporters	  of	  migrants	  benefit	  enormously	  from	  remittances	  while	  net	  importers	  often	  receive	  an	  
injection	  of	  skills,	  entrepreneurialism	  and	  cultural	  energy.	  Poorly	  managed	  processes	  however	  can	  lead	  
to	  problems	  such	  as	  social	  unrest,	  human	  trafficking	  and	  social	  discrimination.	  
Popular	  reasons	  for	  migration	  include	  economic	  and	  educational	  opportunities,	  but	  in	  recent	  years	  
involuntary	  migration	  as	  a	  result	  of	  political	  conflict	  has	  risen	  to	  levels	  unknown	  since	  the	  immediate	  
aftermath	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  Crawford	  et	  al.	  (2015)	  observe	  that	  in	  2014,	  59.5	  million	  people	  were	  forcibly	  
displaced	  in	  the	  world,	  compared	  to	  40	  million	  at	  the	  time	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  For	  Europe,	  at	  least,	  the	  
flows	  of	  migration	  have	  emerged	  as	  a	  key	  social	  and	  political	  risk,	  and	  a	  major	  factor	  for	  the	  future	  of	  
the	  continent,	  with	  undoubted	  global	  impacts.	  
There	  are	  other	  emergent	  trends	  in	  terms	  of	  migrations.	  There	  is,	  for	  example,	  a	  greater	  proportion	  than	  
before	  of	  females	  in	  migrant	  flows,	  with	  the	  United	  Nations	  (UN)	  Population	  Division	  reporting	  that	  
48.2%	  of	  transnational	  migrants	  in	  2015	  were	  female	  (UN	  2015).	  Another	  trend	  is	  the	  longer	  period	  
spent	  by	  migrants	  in	  host	  countries.	  In	  the	  1980s	  the	  average	  length	  of	  displacement	  in	  involuntary	  
migration	  was	  nine	  years	  but	  this	  time	  increased	  to	  20	  years	  by	  the	  mid-­‐2000s	  (WEF,	  Global	  Risks	  Report	  
2016).	  Displacement	  is	  becoming	  a	  more	  urban	  phenomenon	  with	  a	  far	  smaller	  proportion	  of	  displaced	  
people	  than	  before	  being	  held	  in	  camps.	  
The	  key	  uncertainties	  moving	  forward	  lie	  in	  what	  will	  happen	  with	  these	  migration	  trends	  and	  what	  
responses	  they	  will	  garner.	  The	  current	  surge	  in	  involuntary	  migration	  has	  exposed	  multiple	  problems	  in	  
the	  institutional	  architecture	  handling	  migration,	  and	  has	  also	  revealed	  again	  the	  risks	  associated	  with	  
the	  responses	  of	  host	  societies	  to	  migrants.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  receiving	  countries	  develop	  an	  
absorption	  capacity	  for	  migration	  that	  is	  able	  to	  maximise	  the	  potentials	  of	  migration	  is	  critical	  to	  
demographic,	  social,	  economic	  and	  political	  futures.	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South	  African	  Trends	  
The	  South	  African	  case	  reveals	  some	  of	  the	  uncertainties	  in	  demographic	  projection.	  It	  reinforces	  once	  
more	  the	  point	  that	  even	  with	  something	  as	  seemingly	  predictable	  (in	  the	  short-­‐	  to	  medium-­‐term,	  at	  
least)	  there	  are	  uncertainties.	  
In	  some	  respects,	  South	  Africa’s	  trends	  have	  followed	  global	  trends.	  There	  has,	  for	  example,	  been	  a	  
steady	  drop	  in	  crude	  birth	  rates	  from	  over	  40	  per	  1000	  in	  the	  1960s	  to	  the	  current	  22.7	  per	  1000.	  Infant	  
mortality	  rates	  nearly	  halved	  from	  the	  1950s	  until	  the	  1980s.	  Since	  2002,	  infant	  mortality	  rates	  have	  
dropped	  from	  51.2	  to	  34.4	  per	  1000	  live	  births	  (Stats	  SA,	  2015)	  
However,	  South	  Africa	  has	  also	  faced	  unpredicted	  events,	  most	  notably,	  the	  HIV/Aids	  epidemic	  and	  
subsequently	  the	  further	  surprise	  of	  the	  recent	  success	  in	  stabilising	  the	  epidemic.	  Projections	  made	  in	  
the	  1980s	  had	  no	  means	  of	  taking	  the	  epidemic	  into	  account,	  while	  projections	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  were	  
overly	  dire	  in	  terms	  of	  demographic	  consequences.	  Consistent	  with	  global	  trends,	  crude	  death	  rates	  
dropped	  from	  around	  20	  per	  1000	  deaths	  annually	  around	  1960	  to	  8.5	  per	  1000	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  
There	  was	  however	  then	  a	  sudden	  rise	  to	  around	  15	  per	  1000	  in	  the	  early	  2000s,	  before	  dropping	  
moderately	  to	  the	  current	  9.6	  (Stats	  SA,	  2015).	  
This	  shift	  has	  affected	  both	  natural	  population	  increase	  and	  overall	  population	  growth	  rates.	  	  The	  rate	  of	  
natural	  population	  increase	  has	  fluctauted	  between	  1.12	  and	  1.3	  between	  2002	  and	  2015	  (Stats	  SA,	  
2015).	  Overall	  population	  growth	  reached	  a	  low	  of	  around	  1.28%	  per	  annum	  in	  the	  early	  2000s;	  it	  is	  
estimated	  1.65%	  for	  the	  2014-­‐2015	  year	  (Stats	  SA,	  2015).	  
With	  the	  HIV/Aids	  epidemic	  stabilised	  it	  may	  seem	  possible	  to	  make	  demographic	  projection,	  but	  we	  
simply	  do	  not	  know	  what	  is	  around	  the	  corner.	  At	  most	  we	  can	  say	  with	  a	  relative	  degree	  of	  confidence	  
that	  certain	  emergent	  trends	  are	  likely	  to	  become	  more	  dominant	  into	  the	  future	  including,	  importantly,	  
declining	  fertility	  rates,	  a	  demographic	  ageing	  process,	  and	  reducing	  rates	  of	  urbanisation.	  
On	  urbanisation,	  we	  know	  that	  there	  was	  a	  demographic	  surge	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s	  but	  that	  the	  
rate	  of	  urbanisation	  is	  slowing.	  According	  to	  the	  United	  Nation’s	  World	  Urbanization	  Prospects	  report,	  
the	  project	  level	  of	  urbanisation	  for	  2016	  in	  South	  Africa	  is	  65.3%	  which	  is	  significantly	  up	  from	  the	  52%	  
in	  1990	  (UN,	  World	  Urbanization	  Prospects	  2014).	  However,	  the	  urbanisation	  curve	  appears	  to	  be	  
levelling	  with	  a	  project	  gradual	  increase	  in	  urbanisation	  levels	  to	  71.3%	  in	  2030,	  after	  which	  the	  curve	  
will	  be	  almost	  flat	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  present	  day	  Brazil	  or	  Russia).	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Since	  Gauteng,	  including	  Johannesburg,	  is	  currently	  the	  major	  beneficiary	  of	  urbanization	  what	  does	  this	  
mean	  for	  anticipate	  population	  growth?	  Gauteng	  is	  also	  most	  affected	  within	  South	  Africa	  by	  declining	  
fertility	  levels.	  The	  fertility	  rate	  for	  Gauteng	  is	  2.08,	  the	  lowest	  in	  country	  and	  progressively	  declining.	  
This	  is	  also	  lower	  than	  the	  calculated	  fertility	  replacement	  rate	  of	  2.1.	  (Stats	  SA,	  2015).	  
The	  possible	  effect	  of	  these	  changes	  for	  Johannesburg	  is	  revealed	  in	  the	  UN	  historical	  data	  and	  
projections	  of	  annual	  population	  growth	  to	  2030	  indicated	  below	  in	  Figure	  1	  and	  begs	  the	  question	  of	  
whether	  our	  current	  strategizing	  and	  planning	  is	  based	  on	  a	  forward	  projection	  from	  the	  heady	  days	  of	  
population	  growth	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s.	  	  
With	  the	  probable	  continued	  decline	  in	  fertility	  rates	  in	  Gauteng	  and	  Johannesburg,	  continued	  
population	  growth	  will	  increasingly	  be	  driven	  by	  in-­‐migration.	  With	  domestic	  in-­‐migration	  tailing	  off,	  
transnational	  migration	  may	  become	  increasingly	  important.	  
According	  to	  the	  2011	  Census,	  foreign	  migrants	  accounted	  for	  26.3%	  of	  arrivals	  into	  Gauteng	  between	  
2006	  and	  2011	  with	  the	  predominant	  flows	  from	  Zimbabwe,	  Mozambique,	  Lesotho,	  Malawi,	  UK,	  Nigeria,	  
Zambia,	  India,	  Swaziland,	  DRC,	  Congo,	  Namibia,	  Portugal,	  Ethiopia,	  Germany,	  China	  and	  Pakistan	  (Stats	  












Johannesburg	  Growth	  Rates	  
Figure	  2:	  Historical	  and	  Projected	  Annual	  Population	  Growth	  Rates	  for	  Johannesburg,	  1950-­‐2030.	  (UN,	  
2014)	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slowdown	  and	  eventual	  ageing	  will	  be	  ameliorated.	  There	  are,	  however,	  a	  range	  of	  uncertainties	  
including:	  the	  slowdown	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  economy	  relative	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  Africa	  which	  reduces	  the	  
desirability	  of	  Gauteng	  as	  a	  destination;	  unfavourable	  exchange	  rates	  and	  xenophobic	  violence.	  2.3	  Environmental	  
Environmental	  risks	  and	  trends	  are	  now	  widely	  acknowledged	  but	  high	  levels	  of	  uncertainty	  remain.	  
Climate	  Change,	  energy,	  water	  and	  food	  are	  described	  below	  to	  illustrate	  the	  uncertain	  and	  insecure	  
future	  of	  environmental	  resources.	  However,	  there	  are	  additional	  areas	  of	  resource	  and	  broader	  
environmental	  insecurity	  that	  we	  do	  not	  address	  here.	  These	  include,	  for	  example,	  loss	  of	  biodiversity,	  
the	  health	  effects	  of	  Johannesburg’s	  relatively	  high	  levels	  of	  air	  pollution1,	  and	  waste	  management	  in	  a	  
context	  where	  landfill	  sites	  have	  limited	  spare	  capacity.	  
Climate	  Change	  
The	  major	  environmental	  uncertainty	  is	  arguably	  around	  climate	  change	  but	  unlike	  others	  areas	  of	  
uncertainty	  globally	  there	  is	  a	  single	  source	  of	  authoritative	  analysis	  which	  represents	  a	  near	  consensus	  
within	  the	  scientific	  community	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  uncertainty.	  The	  Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  
Climate	  Change	  (IPCC)	  set	  up	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Environmental	  Programme	  and	  
World	  Meteorological	  Organisation	  brings	  together	  leading	  scientists	  globally	  in	  an	  extensive	  on-­‐going	  
process	  of	  research	  and	  deliberation.	  The	  consensus	  that	  emerges	  from	  this	  process	  is	  published	  in	  
major	  assessment	  reports.	  It	  is	  an	  evolving	  consensus	  that	  responds	  to	  the	  new	  data	  or	  insight	  that	  
emerges	  over	  time,	  providing	  a	  model	  that	  could	  be	  replicated	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  global	  uncertainty	  and	  
at	  other	  spatial	  scales,	  including	  the	  level	  of	  the	  city.	  
The	  IPCC’s	  Fifth	  Assessment	  Report	  provides	  a	  comprehensive	  view	  of	  the	  likely	  outcomes	  of	  climate	  
change,	  emphasising	  probabilities	  rather	  than	  predictions.	  The	  consensus	  is	  that	  it	  is	  extremely	  likely	  
that	  the	  massively	  increased	  concentrations	  of	  carbon	  dioxide,	  methane	  and	  nitrous	  oxide	  since	  the	  pre-­‐
industrial	  era	  are	  primarily	  the	  result	  of	  human	  action,	  and	  that	  these	  changes	  have	  already	  caused	  
impacts	  on	  natural	  and	  human	  systems	  on	  all	  continents	  and	  across	  the	  oceans.	  There	  is	  high	  confidence	  
that	  climate	  change	  to	  date	  has	  affected	  the	  activities	  and	  movement	  of	  a	  range	  of	  terrestrial,	  marine	  
and	  freshwater	  species,	  and	  that	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  crop	  yields	  have	  been	  higher	  than	  the	  positive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Johannesburg	  is	  well	  into	  the	  top	  ten	  percent	  of	  the	  worst	  air	  polluted	  cities	  globally	  and,	  rather	  shockingly,	  in	  the	  
same	  league	  as	  many	  notoriously	  polluted	  cities	  in	  China	  and	  India	  (WHO,	  2014)	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effects.	  There	  is	  medium	  confidence	  that	  hydrological	  and	  water	  systems	  globally	  have	  been	  altered	  
because	  of	  this	  change.	  (IPCC	  2015)	  
There	  is,	  of	  course,	  greater	  degrees	  of	  uncertainty	  concerning	  the	  future.	  Although	  there	  is	  a	  high	  level	  
of	  existing	  consensus	  over	  possible	  impacts	  as	  displayed	  in	  Figure	  2,	  there	  are	  still	  a	  range	  of	  potential	  
scenarios	  dependant	  on	  whether	  increased	  temperature	  can	  be	  kept	  below	  2°C	  higher	  than	  pre-­‐
industrial	  levels.	  We	  cannot	  explain	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  report	  here	  but	  suffice	  to	  indicate	  the	  high	  
levels	  of	  existing	  consensus	  that:	  
• Surface	  temperature	  is	  projected	  to	  rise	  over	  the	  21st	  century	  under	  all	  assessed	  emission	  
scenarios.	  
• It	  is	  very	  likely	  that	  heat	  waves	  will	  occur	  more	  often	  and	  last	  longer,	  and	  that	  extreme	  
precipitation	  events	  will	  become	  more	  intense	  and	  frequent	  in	  many	  regions.	  
• It	  is	  very	  likely	  that	  he	  ocean	  will	  continue	  to	  warm	  and	  acidify,	  and	  global	  mean	  sea	  level	  to	  rise.	  
• Climate	  change	  will	  amplify	  existing	  risks	  and	  create	  new	  risks	  for	  natural	  and	  human	  systems.	  
• Risks	  are	  unevenly	  distributed	  and	  are	  generally	  greater	  for	  disadvantaged	  people	  and	  
communities	  in	  countries	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  development.	  
• Many	  aspects	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  associated	  impacts	  will	  continue	  for	  centuries,	  even	  if	  
anthropogenic	  emissions	  of	  greenhouse	  gases	  are	  stopped.	  
• Substantial	  emissions	  reductions	  over	  the	  next	  few	  decades	  can	  reduce	  climate	  risks	  in	  the	  21st	  
century	  and	  beyond,	  increase	  prospects	  for	  effective	  adaptation,	  and	  reduce	  the	  costs	  and	  
challenges	  of	  mitigation	  in	  the	  longer	  term.	  
• There	  is	  high	  confidence	  that	  without	  additional	  mitigation	  efforts	  beyond	  those	  in	  place	  today,	  
and	  even	  with	  adaptation,	  warming	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  21st	  century	  will	  lead	  to	  high	  to	  very	  high	  
risk	  of	  severe,	  widespread	  and	  irreversible	  impacts	  globally	  
• Taking	  a	  longer-­‐term	  perspective,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  sustainable	  development,	  increases	  the	  
likelihood	  that	  more	  immediate	  adaptation	  actions	  will	  also	  enhance	  future	  options	  and	  
preparedness.	  (IPCC	  2015)	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Figure	  3:	  Spatial	  Modelling	  of	  Existing	  and	  Anticipated	  Climate	  Change.	  (IPCC,	  2015)	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While	  uncertainty	  around	  climate	  change	  and	  its	  effects	  is	  high	  globally,	  it	  is	  considerably	  amplified	  at	  a	  
local	  level.	  The	  IPCC	  has	  undertaken	  some	  spatially	  referenced	  modelling	  which	  indicated,	  for	  example,	  
the	  expected	  disproportionately	  large	  rise	  in	  average	  surface	  temperatures	  in	  the	  southern	  African	  
interior;	  decreases	  in	  average	  precipitation	  across	  most	  of	  southern	  Africa	  with	  small	  areas	  of	  exception	  
such	  as	  the	  east	  coast;	  a	  more	  than	  average	  rise	  in	  sea-­‐level	  along	  the	  sub-­‐Saharan	  African	  coastline;	  
and	  so	  forth	  (IPCC	  2015).	  	  
The	  City	  of	  Johannesburg	  (COJ)	  has	  commissioned	  its	  own	  modelling	  which	  suggests	  that	  temperatures	  
in	  the	  city	  may	  increase	  by	  around	  2.3	  degrees	  C	  in	  the	  near	  future	  (2056	  -­‐	  2065)	  and	  by	  around	  4.4	  
degrees	  C	  in	  the	  far	  future	  (2081	  -­‐	  2100),	  with	  projected	  variation	  across	  seasons.	  It	  also	  suggests	  that	  
there	  is	  a	  substantial	  risk	  that	  Johannesburg	  will	  experience	  a	  higher	  frequency	  of	  storm	  events,	  and	  a	  
longer	  and	  wetter	  rainy	  season,	  with	  intensifying	  heat	  island	  effects	  (COJ	  2009).	  
While	  Johannesburg	  may	  experience	  intensified	  flooding	  and	  storm	  damage,	  and	  more	  frequent	  heat	  
waves,	  the	  biggest	  impacts	  of	  climate	  change	  on	  Johannesburg	  may	  however	  come	  from	  the	  transmitted	  
impacts	  from	  the	  wider	  region.	  Joubert	  (200881)	  writes	  that	  “the	  west	  of	  South	  Africa	  will	  become	  
hotter	  and	  drier,	  the	  east	  will	  become	  hotter	  and	  possibly	  wetter,	  but	  this	  will	  not	  spare	  it	  from	  the	  
impact	  of	  increasing	  drought	  stress”.	  The	  IPCC	  has	  predicted	  that	  drought	  may	  reduce	  food	  production	  
in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  by	  as	  much	  as	  a	  20%	  and	  this	  could	  well	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  food	  security	  in	  the	  city.	  
There	  is	  also	  a	  danger	  that	  water	  supply	  to	  the	  Vaal	  River	  (including	  from	  the	  augmented	  supplies	  from	  
other	  catchments)	  will	  become	  increasingly	  variable	  resulting	  in	  worsening	  water	  shortages	  in	  
Johannesburg.	  
While	  of	  huge	  importance,	  not	  all	  environmental	  challenges	  relate	  back	  to	  climate	  change,	  and	  an	  
analysis	  of	  environmental	  uncertainty	  must	  explore	  a	  range	  of	  other	  impacts	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  
natural	  environment	  and	  resource	  security.	  Energy,	  water	  and	  food	  security	  are	  also	  major	  concerns	  
which	  may	  be	  exacerbated	  by	  climate	  change	  but	  have	  other	  sources	  of	  uncertainty.	  
	  
Energy	  
The	  World	  Energy	  Council	  reports	  that	  “the	  energy	  sector	  is	  once	  again	  affected	  by	  high	  levels	  of	  
uncertainty”	  (WEC	  2015).	  It	  acknowledges	  the	  insecurities	  brought	  by	  climate	  change	  but	  identifies	  a	  
range	  of	  other	  sources	  of	  insecurity.	  Energy	  prices	  are	  currently	  a	  major	  uncertainty	  creating	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considerable	  insecurity	  around	  key	  investment	  decisions	  in	  sustainable	  energy,	  for	  example.	  Energy	  
prices	  have	  plunged	  over	  the	  past	  few	  years	  as	  a	  result	  of	  weaker	  global	  demand	  and	  oversupply	  in	  
some	  markets.	  While	  there	  are	  signs	  of	  price	  recovery,	  the	  longer	  term	  market	  is	  highly	  unpredictable.	  
The	  energy	  sector	  is	  also	  strong	  influenced	  by	  geopolitics	  with	  key	  concerns	  including	  United	  States	  
energy	  policy,	  developments	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  tensions	  involving	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  Russia,	  and	  
developments	  in	  China	  and	  India.	  There	  are	  also	  other	  critical	  factors	  in	  the	  mix	  such	  as	  regulation	  and	  
technology.	  There	  has	  been	  considerable	  progress	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  in	  the	  shift	  towards	  
renewable	  sources	  of	  energy	  but	  it	  is	  uncertain	  whether	  the	  progress	  can	  be	  sustained.	  The	  coal	  and	  oil	  
lobbies	  remains	  powerful	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  but	  there	  are	  also	  technological	  bottlenecks.	  For	  
example,	  while	  progress	  has	  been	  made	  in	  the	  production	  of	  green	  energy,	  there	  has	  been	  far	  less	  
progress	  on	  the	  storage	  of	  energy	  and	  on	  developing	  transmission	  systems	  that	  can	  cope	  with	  the	  
intermittent	  supplies	  provided	  by	  small	  scale	  independent	  producers	  (WEC	  2015).	  
There	  are	  additional	  uncertainties	  in	  the	  South	  African	  and	  Johannesburg	  context.	  Since	  2007	  South	  
Africa	  has	  been	  in	  the	  throes	  of	  an	  energy	  crisis	  which	  was	  caused	  largely	  by	  deficiencies	  in	  long-­‐term	  
planning	  and	  by	  long	  delays	  in	  bringing	  planned	  capacity	  online	  (i.e.	  the	  Kusile	  and	  Medupi	  power	  
stations).	  The	  short	  term	  supply	  constraints	  are	  easing	  as	  the	  new	  power	  stations	  are	  gradually	  coming	  
on	  line	  and	  as	  new	  supply	  sources	  are	  emerging	  through	  Independent	  Power	  Producers	  (IPPs).	  There	  
are,	  however,	  medium-­‐	  to	  longer-­‐term	  uncertainties	  which	  include	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  global	  
uncertainties,	  national	  policy	  decisions	  (currently	  obscured	  by	  controversies	  over	  nuclear	  planning	  in	  the	  
energy	  mix),	  and	  planning	  and	  operating	  capacity.	  Johannesburg’s	  extremely	  high	  dependence	  on	  Eskom	  
and	  the	  national	  power	  grid	  means	  it	  has	  little	  leverage	  in	  responding	  to	  these	  uncertainties.	  While	  the	  
city	  may	  pursue	  a	  longer	  term	  policy	  of	  reducing	  dependencies,	  and	  gaining	  greater	  control	  over	  energy	  
sources,	  its’	  primary	  point	  of	  impact	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future	  is	  in	  promoting	  greater	  energy	  efficiency	  
across	  a	  range	  of	  sectors.	  Through	  wheeling	  agreements	  it	  may	  however	  be	  able	  to	  increase	  the	  mix	  of	  
its	  energy	  sources,	  including	  through	  procurement	  of	  green	  energy	  from	  IPPs.	  
Water	  
Water	  supply	  is	  another	  area	  of	  considerable	  uncertainty.	  In	  the	  period	  1900	  to	  2010,	  global	  water	  use	  
expanded	  by	  eight	  times,	  an	  entirely	  unsustainable	  rate	  of	  growth	  into	  the	  future.	  As	  water	  supply	  and	  
demand	  are	  highly	  uneven	  spatially,	  the	  effects	  of	  this	  non-­‐sustainable	  use	  are	  being	  felt	  unequally.	  
Wada	  et	  al.	  (2016176)	  indicate	  that	  estimations	  of	  likely	  water	  balance	  across	  regions	  globally	  is	  highly	  
complicated	  and	  subject	  to	  multiple	  uncertainties	  in	  relation,	  for	  example,	  to	  “global	  climate	  change,	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population	  growth,	  land	  use	  change,	  globalization	  and	  economic	  development,	  technological	  
innovations,	  political	  stability	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  international	  cooperation”.	  There	  are	  nevertheless	  
attempts	  to	  quantify	  water	  stress	  globally	  using	  global	  hydrological	  or	  water	  resource	  models.	  Wada	  et	  
al.	  (2016)	  point	  out,	  however,	  that	  the	  results	  of	  this	  modelling	  have	  been	  highly	  variable,	  with	  Africa	  
being	  the	  continent	  of	  greatest	  uncertainty,	  and	  that	  there	  is	  not	  enough	  information	  to	  validate	  any	  
particular	  modelling	  approach.	  Wade	  et	  al.	  call	  for	  the	  need	  to	  simultaneously	  plan	  for	  uncertainty	  and	  
improve	  the	  quality	  and	  reach	  of	  data	  and	  modelling.	  
In	  relatively	  water	  scarce	  South	  Africa	  these	  are	  matters	  of	  considerable	  importance.	  There	  have	  been	  
water	  reconciliation	  studies	  for	  each	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  major	  catchments,	  but	  considerable	  risks	  remain	  
at	  the	  level	  of	  both	  assessment	  and	  implementation.	  The	  uncertainties	  surrounding	  the	  multiple	  
variables	  influencing	  both	  demand	  and	  supply	  mean	  that	  the	  assessments	  may	  well	  be	  proven	  incorrect.	  
Equally	  serious	  is	  the	  capacities	  to	  timeously	  implement	  the	  measures	  need	  to	  secure	  water	  supplies	  in	  
each	  catchment.	  Johannesburg,	  and	  more	  broadly,	  Gauteng,	  is	  especially	  vulnerable	  as	  there	  is	  no	  
supply	  of	  water	  in	  the	  near	  vicinity	  able	  to	  support	  its	  growing	  population	  and	  economy,	  with	  Turton	  et	  
al.	  (n.d.145)	  writing	  that	  securing	  Johannesburg’s	  water	  supply	  is	  “likely	  to	  become	  one	  of	  the	  single	  
most	  important	  challenges	  in	  the	  mid-­‐term	  future.”	  
	  The	  city	  has	  relied	  on	  technical	  ingenuity	  to	  secure	  water	  supplies––from	  the	  Vaal	  Dam	  in	  the	  1930s,	  to	  
the	  Tugela-­‐Vaal	  water	  transfer	  in	  the	  1970s,	  to	  the	  Lesotho	  Highlands	  Water	  Scheme	  from	  the	  1990s.	  A	  
key	  question	  is	  how	  long	  will	  it	  be	  before	  further	  augmentation	  of	  water	  supply	  is	  required,	  and	  where	  
will	  the	  additional	  water	  come	  from.	  A	  2009	  study	  indicated	  that	  with	  these	  measures	  and	  the	  planned	  
augmentation,	  a	  major	  new	  augmentation	  scheme	  could	  be	  delayed	  until	  2040	  (Department	  of	  Water	  
Affairs	  and	  Forestry,	  2009).	  However,	  this	  was	  contingent	  on	  a	  range	  of	  demand	  management	  and	  other	  
measures	  being	  implemented	  including	  improved	  enforcement	  of	  unlawful	  water	  use,	  demand	  
management	  by	  municipalities	  to	  reduce	  losses	  in	  the	  system;	  re-­‐use	  of	  treated	  effluent	  to	  improve	  the	  
water	  balance;	  and,	  use	  of	  water	  pumped	  from	  the	  gold	  mines.	  Early	  indications	  are	  that	  there	  are	  long	  
lags	  in	  implementing	  such	  measures.	  The	  water	  restrictions	  introduced	  in	  2015	  were	  a	  combination	  of	  
both	  technical	  failures	  in	  pumping	  and	  storage	  and	  fears	  of	  a	  drought-­‐relates	  shortage.	  
Ultimately,	  augmentation	  will	  almost	  certainly	  be	  required	  if	  Johannesburg	  is	  to	  continue	  growing.	  There	  
has	  been	  a	  longstanding	  proposal	  to	  direct	  water	  from	  the	  Zambezi	  River	  to	  Gauteng	  through	  a	  system	  
of	  pipelines	  and	  open	  canals,	  but	  there	  are	  analysts	  who	  point	  to	  the	  extreme	  difficulties	  of	  achieving	  
this	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  the	  institutional	  and	  political	  difficulties	  in	  drawing	  water	  from	  a	  catchment	  which	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crosses	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  six	  countries,	  and	  the	  emerging	  shortage	  of	  water	  in	  the	  upper	  reaches	  of	  the	  
Zambezi	  River	  where	  the	  water	  take-­‐off	  would	  have	  to	  happen	  (Hill	  2015).	  
Food	  
Uncertainties	  around	  food	  security	  are	  another	  concern.	  The	  demand	  for	  food	  is	  expected	  to	  increase	  by	  
50%	  to	  2050	  but	  there	  are	  considerable	  uncertainties	  around	  food	  supply	  which	  is	  affected	  by	  long-­‐term	  
climate	  change	  and	  shorter-­‐term	  weather	  anomalies,	  international	  conflicts,	  breakdowns	  in	  distribution	  
and	  transport	  infrastructure,	  viral	  outbreaks,	  exchange	  rate	  volatility,	  land	  and	  water	  competition,	  
public	  policy	  and	  regulation	  (e.g.	  in	  relation	  to	  GMOs	  and	  bioenergy	  subsidies),	  and	  a	  lot	  more.	  Rudoph	  
et	  al.	  (2012)	  conclude	  that	  for	  Johannesburg	  the	  current	  challenge	  of	  food	  insecurity	  has	  less	  to	  do	  with	  
supply	  shortages	  or	  volatility	  and	  more	  to	  do	  with	  problems	  of	  income,	  poverty,	  unemployment	  and	  
economic	  volatility.	  Put	  simply,	  households	  in	  Johannesburg	  are	  food	  insecure	  because	  they	  cannot	  
afford	  to	  put	  food	  on	  the	  table.	  However,	  into	  the	  longer-­‐term,	  supply	  constraints	  driven	  by	  the	  regional	  
effects	  of	  climate	  change	  may	  drive	  up	  food	  prices	  the	  city	  in	  the	  context	  of	  already	  high	  levels	  of	  
affordability	  produced	  food	  insecurity.	  	  2.4	  Economic	  
Perhaps	  more	  than	  anything	  else,	  it	  is	  the	  volatile	  global	  economy	  which	  has	  provoked	  the	  heightened	  
sense	  of	  uncertainty	  in	  recent	  years.	  Of	  course	  there	  is	  a	  massive	  cone	  of	  uncertainty	  over	  the	  longer	  
term,	  but	  even	  the	  short-­‐term	  is	  highly	  uncertain	  in	  economic	  terms.	  
Global	  Economy	  
The	  UN’s	  Economic	  Situation	  and	  Prospects	  Report	  (2016)	  indicates	  that	  in	  2015	  and	  2016	  the	  overall	  
global	  gross	  domestic	  product	  (GDP)	  growth	  rates	  were	  an	  anaemic	  2.4%	  with	  problems	  associated	  with	  
weak	  demand,	  low	  investment,	  low	  commodity	  prices	  and	  financial	  market	  turbulence.	  The	  
International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF)	  has	  titled	  its	  2016	  report	  on	  global	  prospects	  “Subdued	  Demand,	  
Diminished	  Prospects”	  referring	  to	  problems	  such	  as:	  the	  global	  slowdown	  and	  rebalancing	  of	  the	  
economy	  in	  China	  but	  with	  a	  faster	  than	  expected	  slowdown	  in	  imports	  and	  exports;	  low	  energy	  and	  
commodity	  prices;	  and,	  the	  gradual	  tightening	  of	  monetary	  policy	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (IMF	  2016).	  There	  
is	  however	  considerable	  variation	  across	  regions	  and	  countries,	  as	  indicated	  in	  Figure	  3.	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The	  United	  States,	  on	  average,	  has	  done	  relatively	  well	  in	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  years	  with	  annual	  growth	  rates	  
sustained	  above	  2%.	  Japan’s	  economy	  has	  been	  volatile	  with	  GDP	  growth	  of	  only	  0.5%	  in	  2016	  and	  the	  
threat	  of	  recession.	  Europe	  has	  struggled	  in	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  years	  with	  considerable	  divergence	  in	  the	  
core	  and	  margins	  of	  the	  continent	  which	  has	  threatened	  to	  unravel	  the	  European	  Union.	  In	  2016,	  the	  
European	  economy	  expanded	  by	  1.6%	  with	  considerable	  variance	  between	  the	  relative	  stable	  core	  
(especially	  Germany)	  and	  the	  fractious	  periphery	  (e.g.	  Greece,	  Italy,	  Spain	  and	  Portugal).	  The	  so-­‐called	  
‘economies	  in	  transition’	  (mainly	  the	  previous	  Soviet	  Union)	  have	  performed	  poorly	  in	  recent	  years,	  with	  
growth	  prospects	  still	  deteriorating.	  The	  Russian	  Federation	  is	  in	  recession	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  slump	  in	  
energy	  prices	  and	  international	  sanctions,	  with	  smaller	  countries	  in	  Central	  Asia	  and	  the	  Caucasus	  also	  in	  
trouble.	  Eastern	  Europe	  has	  performed	  better.	  (UN	  2016)	  
There	  has	  also	  been	  a	  serious	  recent	  deterioration	  in	  the	  situation	  of	  emergent	  and	  poorer	  economies.	  
Since	  the	  1990s,	  China’s	  growth	  has	  frequently	  exceeded	  10%	  per	  annum,	  but	  the	  Chinese	  leadership	  
now	  refers	  to	  a	  “new	  normal”	  with	  growth	  rates	  of	  around	  7-­‐7.5%,	  with	  the	  actual	  growth	  rate	  in	  2016	  
around	  6.4%.	  The	  slowdown	  in	  this	  2nd	  largest	  economy	  in	  the	  world	  has	  had	  a	  knock-­‐on	  effect	  across	  
Figure	  4:	  Global	  Variations	  in	  GDP	  and	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  Change	  (UN	  2016)	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the	  world.	  South	  Asia	  has	  been	  the	  exception	  with	  India’s	  economy	  accelerating	  to	  7.3%	  in	  2016	  and	  
Iran’s	  economy	  recovering	  momentum	  after	  the	  effects	  of	  international	  sanctions.	  The	  UN	  advises	  
however	  that	  there	  are	  still	  serious	  structural	  constraints	  to	  be	  overcome	  in	  this	  region,	  including	  low	  
female	  participation	  in	  the	  workforce,	  energy	  shortages	  and	  infrastructure	  gaps.	  Latin	  America	  has	  
experienced	  a	  sharp	  decline	  in	  GDP	  (and	  GDP	  per	  capita)	  with	  its	  leading	  economy,	  Brazil,	  in	  a	  prolonged	  
recession	  exacerbated	  by	  political	  turmoil,	  and	  this	  crisis	  spilling	  over	  into	  Argentina	  and	  other	  
neighbouring	  countries.	  (UN	  2016)	  
Closer	  to	  home,	  Africa’s	  growth	  performance	  has	  also	  declined	  recently.	  Despite	  some	  attempts	  at	  
economic	  diversification,	  the	  continent	  as	  a	  whole	  remains	  very	  dependent	  on	  commodity	  and	  so	  the	  
drop	  in	  commodity	  prices	  has	  had	  a	  severe	  effect	  on	  performance.	  This	  has	  been	  compounded	  by	  
factors	  such	  as	  energy	  shortages,	  infrastructure	  deficits,	  pandemics	  (i.e.	  Ebola)	  and	  security	  concerns.	  
GDP	  per	  capita	  growth	  over	  the	  period	  2015	  to	  2017	  is	  only	  expected	  to	  average	  0.4%	  per	  annum,	  a	  
setback	  after	  two	  decades	  of	  significant	  progress	  (UN	  2016).	  
The	  situation	  outlined	  above	  reflects	  the	  immediate	  conditions	  across	  the	  globe	  with	  the	  UN	  and	  IMF,	  
for	  example,	  only	  projecting	  as	  far	  as	  20172.	  The	  reality	  is	  that	  there	  is	  extreme	  uncertainty	  with	  even	  
medium-­‐term	  forecast	  impossible.	  There	  is	  a	  real	  danger	  that	  the	  world	  is	  trapped	  in	  a	  “low	  growth	  
equilibrium”	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future	  (UN	  2016)	  but	  there	  are	  opportunities	  that	  may	  emerge	  from	  
new	  technologies,	  for	  example.	  Some	  of	  the	  risks	  and	  possibilities	  are	  outlined	  briefly	  below:	  	  
Long-­‐term	  Decline	  in	  Productivity	  (but	  with	  a	  possible	  turnaround)	  
Growth	  in	  productivity	  is	  widely	  regarded	  as	  a	  primary	  driver	  of	  economic	  growth	  and	  so	  this	  decline	  
suggests	  that	  long	  term	  global	  growth	  prospects	  are	  not	  positive.	  There	  are	  uncertainties	  with	  the	  
possibility	  that	  emergent	  technologies	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  new	  wave	  of	  productivity	  growth	  by	  stimulating	  
business	  and	  individual	  innovation.	  (WEF	  2016)	  
China’s	  Performance	  
China’s	  economic	  performance,	  and	  the	  risks	  that	  it	  faces	  in	  making	  its	  economic	  transition	  from	  an	  
economy	  based	  on	  infrastructure	  investments	  and	  industrial	  exports	  to	  an	  economy	  geared	  to	  
internal	  consumption	  and	  service	  industries,	  weighs	  heavily	  on	  the	  global	  economy.	  As	  China	  is	  now	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The	  IMF	  does	  envisage	  a	  slight	  pick-­‐up	  in	  growth	  in	  parts	  of	  Europe,	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  Africa	  into	  2017	  but	  
warns	  that	  the	  recovery	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  weaker	  than	  expected	  (IMF,	  2016).	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the	  world’s	  second	  largest	  economy,	  and	  has	  been	  driving	  growth	  in	  the	  demand	  for	  commodities,	  a	  
sharper	  than	  expect	  slowdown	  would	  have	  a	  serious	  knock-­‐on	  effect	  globally,	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  
commodity	  process,	  financial	  markets,	  and	  general	  confidence	  in	  the	  global	  economy.	  The	  major	  
source	  of	  current	  concern	  is	  the	  massive	  debt	  build-­‐up	  in	  China,	  and	  especially	  with	  the	  corporate	  
sector,	  and	  in	  local	  and	  regional	  government.	  In	  2014,	  the	  ratio	  of	  debt	  to	  assets	  in	  China’s	  
construction	  sector	  exceeded	  250:1	  (WEF,	  2016)	  
There	  is	  a	  huge	  risk	  for	  China’s	  still	  inadequately	  regulated	  financial	  sector	  as	  much	  of	  the	  credit	  
expansion	  in	  the	  recent	  past	  was	  in	  sectors	  which	  are	  now	  in	  decline.	  There	  is	  a	  catch-­‐22	  for	  public	  
policy	  as	  tightening	  credit	  might	  strangle	  consumption	  with	  would	  undermine	  the	  basis	  of	  China’s	  
emergent	  new	  economy	  while	  loosening	  credit	  would	  increase	  levels	  of	  indebtedness,	  worsening	  
future	  risks.	  The	  hope	  is	  that	  service	  based	  industries	  and	  high-­‐end	  manufacturing	  will	  grow	  
sufficiently	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  troubles	  in	  construction	  and	  low-­‐end	  export	  oriented	  industry.	  
(WEF	  2016)	  
Fiscal	  Space	  
This	  is	  an	  opportunity	  that	  may	  support	  higher	  growth	  into	  the	  future.	  While	  there	  are	  high	  
corporate	  debt	  levels,	  levels	  of	  national	  debt	  are	  at	  an	  all-­‐time	  low,	  leaving	  many	  countries	  with	  the	  
‘fiscal	  space’	  to	  expand	  public	  investment	  and	  absorb	  fiscal	  shocks.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  in	  China,	  for	  
example,	  where	  there	  are	  still	  large	  foreign	  reserves	  and	  low	  levels	  of	  national	  debt.	  The	  UN	  
(201616)	  estimates	  that	  “an	  increase	  in	  fiscal	  expenditures	  of	  1	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  in	  the	  G7	  countries	  
and	  China	  could	  raise	  world	  gross	  product	  growth	  from	  2.4	  to	  3.8	  per	  cent	  this	  year”.	  There	  is	  also	  
ample	  room,	  argues	  the	  UN,	  to	  improve	  fiscal	  efficiencies	  and	  achieve	  greater	  leverage	  by	  co-­‐
ordinating	  stimulus	  measures	  across	  national	  boundaries.	  	  
Geopolitical	  Tensions	  
Most	  analysts	  advise	  that	  geopolitical	  tensions	  globally	  are	  a	  severe	  threat	  to	  the	  medium-­‐term	  
prospects	  of	  the	  global	  economy	  (UN	  2016)	  (WEF	  2016)	  (IMF	  2016).	  There	  is	  a	  deep	  concern	  that	  an	  
escalation	  in	  tensions	  could	  negatively	  affect	  global	  confidence;	  disrupt	  trade,	  financial,	  energy	  and	  
tourism	  flows;	  and	  create	  non-­‐sustainable	  migrant	  flows.	  
Again,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  comprehensive	  account	  and	  there	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  factors,	  some	  not	  even	  recognised	  
now,	  which	  will	  emerge	  as	  major	  shapers	  of	  global,	  regional	  and	  national	  economic	  prospects.	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South	  African	  Economy	  
Of	  particular	  concern	  to	  South	  Africa	  and	  Johannesburg	  are	  the	  prospects	  for	  emerging	  economies.	  
Emerging	  economies	  generally	  did	  better	  than	  advanced	  economies	  until	  around	  2011,	  but	  there	  has	  
been	  a	  negative	  turnaround.	  Major	  problems	  facing	  emerging	  economies	  are	  commodity	  prices	  related	  
in	  part	  to	  China’s	  decreasing	  demand;	  the	  corporate	  debt	  build-­‐up;	  volatile	  currencies;	  and	  rising	  
interest	  rates	  in	  advanced	  economies.	  There	  is	  divided	  opinion	  over	  the	  short-­‐	  to	  medium-­‐term	  
prospects	  of	  emerging	  economies.	  Optimists	  point	  to	  very	  recent	  data	  which	  shows	  a	  slight	  turnaround	  
in	  commodity	  prices	  (with	  China,	  for	  example,	  moving	  to	  cap	  the	  oversupply	  of	  steel),	  the	  reluctance	  of	  
the	  US	  Federal	  Reserve	  to	  further	  raise	  interest	  rates,	  and	  India’s	  strong	  economic	  performance.	  
Redlinghuys	  (2015),	  a	  South	  African	  financial	  market	  analyst	  writes	  of	  a	  “messy	  and	  confusing	  world	  
[where]	  forecasting	  what	  is	  happening	  is	  incredibly	  difficult.”	  In	  asking	  the	  question	  “have	  emerging	  
economies	  come	  back	  into	  favour?”	  he	  concludes	  hesitantly,	  “Yes,	  for	  the	  time	  being.”	  
	  
Figure	  5:	  South	  African	  and	  global	  economic	  growth,	  2000-­‐2016.	  Source:	  National	  Treasury,	  2016	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In	  addition	  to	  those	  facing	  the	  global	  economy,	  South	  Africa,	  and	  Johannesburg,	  has	  its	  own	  risks	  and	  
uncertainties.	  The	  National	  Treasury’s	  Budget	  Review	  (2016)	  warned	  that	  since	  around	  2010	  South	  
Africa’s	  growth	  rates	  were	  lower	  than	  the	  world	  (and	  emerging	  economy)	  average,	  suggesting	  national	  
factors	  dampening	  prospects	  and	  increasing	  uncertainties	  (see	  figure	  4).	  The	  review	  downgraded	  growth	  
projections	  from	  1.7%	  for	  2016	  to	  a	  mere	  0.9%,	  raising	  the	  real	  prospect	  of	  recession	  (National	  Treasury,	  
2016).	  Among	  the	  South	  African	  concerns	  (shared,	  of	  course,	  with	  some	  other	  countries)	  are	  the	  
troubles	  in	  the	  mining	  sector,	  labour	  conflicts,	  energy	  shortages,	  and	  political	  and	  policy	  uncertainty.	  A	  
recent	  study	  shows,	  for	  example,	  that	  South	  Africa	  ranks	  high	  on	  a	  policy	  uncertainty	  index	  (Business	  
Day,	  2016)	  with	  the	  IMF	  (2016)	  also	  identifying	  policy	  and	  political	  uncertainties	  in	  South	  Africa	  as	  a	  
growth	  dampener,	  a	  problem	  reflected,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  extreme	  volatility	  of	  the	  Rand	  (see	  figure	  5)	  
	  
	  
Johannesburg	  is	  even	  less	  able	  than	  South	  Africa	  to	  shape	  its	  economic	  fortunes,	  although	  good	  city	  
management	  does	  clearly	  play	  a	  role	  in	  growth	  prospects.	  Johannesburg’s	  economy	  was	  given	  a	  boost	  
with	  the	  ending	  of	  apartheid	  rule,	  with	  both	  increased	  population	  growth	  rates	  which	  stimulated	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  service	  sector	  and	  expansion	  of	  the	  corporate	  sector,	  mainly	  headquartered	  in	  
Johannesburg,	  into	  Africa	  and	  beyond.	  There	  was	  especially	  rapid	  growth	  in	  the	  financial	  and	  business	  
services	  sectors	  which	  became	  the	  leading	  edge	  of	  the	  city	  economy.	  Data	  from	  Global	  	  t	  suggests	  that	  
Johannesburg’s	  economy	  outperformed	  the	  national	  economy	  in	  the	  early	  post-­‐apartheid	  years	  (Data	  
derived	  by	  GSPCR	  from	  Global	  Insight).	  Between	  1996	  and	  2004,	  the	  city	  economy	  grew	  at	  an	  estimated	  
average	  of	  4.5%	  per	  annum,	  and	  Gauteng’s	  economy	  at	  3.9%,	  compared	  with	  the	  national	  average	  of	  2.9	  
Figure	  6:	  Rand-­‐US	  Dollar	  Exchange	  Rate	  over	  5	  years.	  Data	  captured	  on	  31	  May	  2016.	  Source:	  Reuters	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%.	  Growth	  in	  Johannesburg	  and	  Gauteng	  accelerated	  to	  around	  6.4%	  in	  2007,	  reflecting	  improved	  
national	  conditions,	  but	  maintaining	  a	  lead	  over	  the	  national	  economy.	  In	  2008/09	  the	  city	  and	  city-­‐
region	  economy	  dipped	  steeply	  into	  recession,	  as	  did	  the	  national	  economy.	  The	  most	  recent	  data	  for	  
the	  city	  economy	  is	  for	  2013,	  and	  suggests	  a	  growth	  of	  only	  2.1%,	  marginally	  lower	  than	  the	  2.2%	  for	  
South	  Africa	  (Data	  derived	  by	  GSPR	  from	  Global	  Insight).	  
Spatially	  disaggregated	  data	  on	  economic	  output	  is	  not	  sufficiently	  current	  or	  reliable	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  
Johannesburg’s	  performance	  relative	  to	  the	  regional	  or	  national	  economy.	  There	  is	  however	  the	  
Statistics	  SA	  Quarterly	  Labour	  Force	  data	  (2016).	  The	  May	  release	  for	  the	  first	  Quarter	  of	  2016	  provided	  
a	  grim	  picture	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  national	  economy	  indicating	  a	  2.2%	  decline	  in	  employment	  for	  the	  year	  
ending	  March	  2016	  (representing	  the	  loss	  of	  355,000	  jobs).	  As	  indicated	  in	  Figure	  4,	  the	  data	  for	  the	  
metropolitan	  cities	  indicated	  a	  mixed	  picture.	  While	  Johannesburg’s	  overall	  decline	  of	  1.1%	  in	  
employment	  (a	  net	  loss	  of	  1.3%)	  was	  slightly	  better	  than	  the	  national	  average	  it	  is	  still	  of	  deep	  concern.	  
It	  does	  not	  indicate	  a	  city	  economy	  that	  is	  driving	  national	  development.	  
Johannesburg	  and	  its	  wider	  region	  is	  facing	  a	  troubled	  economic	  present	  and	  uncertain	  longer-­‐term	  
prospects.	  There	  are	  critical	  questions	  to	  answer,	  especially	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  mediocre	  performance	  of	  










Figure	  7:	  Percentage	  Change	  in	  Employment	  between	  March	  2015	  and	  March	  2016	  (Stats	  SA,	  2016)	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structural	  issue?	  Have	  the	  post-­‐apartheid	  growth	  drivers	  in	  the	  local	  economy	  dissipated,	  and	  if	  so	  what	  
might	  new	  growth	  drivers	  be?	  2.5	  Technological	  
Technological	  change,	  mainly	  but	  not	  only	  in	  information	  and	  communications	  technology	  (ICT),	  is	  
transforming	  economic	  and	  social	  relations	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  now	  commonly	  labelled	  as	  the	  Fourth	  
Industrial	  Revolution.	  Symbolized	  in	  popular	  life	  by	  ubiquitous	  smart	  phones,	  new	  forms	  of	  
technologically-­‐enabled	  business	  such	  as	  Airbnb	  and	  Uber,	  advances	  in	  engineering	  (e.g.	  smart	  
materials),	  and	  fibre	  optic	  internet	  roll	  out,	  technology	  continues	  to	  have	  profound	  impacts	  on	  cities.	  
While	  progress	  in	  technology	  is	  both	  undeniable	  and	  unavoidable,	  the	  forms	  that	  technological	  
advancement	  will	  take	  are	  unpredictable	  and	  its	  ramifications	  uncertain.	  	  
Risks	  and	  Trends	  
It	  is	  impossible	  to	  predict	  technological	  impact	  as	  there	  is	  not	  real	  way	  of	  knowing––at	  an	  early	  stage,	  at	  
least––which	  of	  these	  trends	  will	  take	  hold,	  and	  what	  the	  societal	  impacts	  will	  be.	  For	  example,	  whether	  
the	  now	  technologically	  feasible	  self-­‐driving	  cars	  will	  have	  any	  real	  take-­‐up	  or	  impact,	  is	  currently	  
unknown;	  and	  is	  subject	  to	  varying	  speculations.	  There	  is	  often	  a	  long	  lag––sometimes	  twenty	  to	  thirty	  
years––between	  the	  actual	  technological	  innovation	  and	  its	  widespread	  take-­‐up,	  and	  an	  even	  longer	  lag	  
between	  the	  innovation	  and	  real	  social	  impact.	  In	  the	  process,	  many	  innovations	  fall	  by	  the	  wayside.	  
While	  outcomes	  are	  unpredictable	  they	  do	  eventually	  become	  gradually	  apparent,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  
reason	  to	  carefully	  monitor	  advances	  in	  science	  and	  technology,	  the	  benefits	  and	  risks	  they	  present,	  and	  
their	  emergent	  outcomes.	  The	  majority	  of	  management	  consulting	  firms	  (e.g.	  Deloitte	  and	  AT	  Kearney)	  
publish	  annual	  reports	  that	  attempts	  to	  identify	  risk	  and	  trends	  in	  technology,	  and	  their	  potential	  impact	  
on	  business.	  For	  2016,	  the	  key	  trends	  of	  identified	  concern	  range	  from	  ‘cyber	  insecurity’	  to	  ‘the	  rise	  of	  
the	  machines’	  (AT	  Kearney,	  2015).	  
The	  Global	  Risks	  Report	  details	  the	  key	  risks	  facing	  the	  world	  in	  various	  spheres	  including	  the	  “adverse	  
consequences	  of	  technological	  advances;	  breakdown	  of	  critical	  information	  infrastructure	  and	  networks;	  
large-­‐scale	  cyber	  attacks;	  massive	  incident	  of	  data	  fraud/theft”	  (WEF	  2016,	  9).	  The	  report	  argues	  that	  
neglecting	  the	  risks	  involved	  in	  technology––especially	  cyber	  risks	  and	  potential	  information	  
infrastructure	  collapse––could	  have	  calamitous	  economic	  results.	  The	  potential	  socio-­‐economic	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ramifications	  of	  technological	  uncertainty	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  section.	  Some	  of	  these	  risks	  and	  
trends	  are	  indicated	  below	  as	  illustrations.	  
Risk:	  Cyber	  Warfare	  
The	  risk	  of	  large-­‐scale	  cyber	  attack	  has	  featured	  prominently	  on	  the	  Global	  Risks	  Report	  since	  2012.	  
While	  this	  risk	  is	  greatest	  in	  North	  America,	  cyber	  attacks	  could	  also	  be	  targeted	  elsewhere.	  While	  cyber	  
attacks	  have	  historically	  been	  isolated	  to	  an	  individual	  entity	  or	  nation,	  as	  technological	  systems	  become	  
increasingly	  interconnected	  and	  cyber	  attacks	  increase	  in	  frequency,	  the	  risk	  increases	  (WEF	  2016).	  For	  
cities	  in	  particular,	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  of	  cyber	  attack	  to	  urban	  infrastructure	  such	  as	  electricity	  grids	  and	  
rapid	  transit	  systems.	  At	  a	  NATO	  workshop	  on	  cyber	  warfare	  in	  2015,	  “the	  risk	  of	  escalation,	  both	  in	  the	  
nature	  and	  in	  the	  number	  of	  conflicts,	  was	  perceived	  as	  realistic	  by	  both	  the	  speakers	  and	  the	  audience	  
attending	  the	  workshop.	  Deterrence	  therefore	  emerged	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  pressing	  challenges	  posed	  
by	  cyber	  warfare”	  (Taddeo,	  2015).	  Despite	  cyber	  warfare	  posing	  a	  risk	  to	  the	  global	  political	  balance,	  
deterrence,	  monitoring	  and	  justice	  are	  difficult	  to	  achieve,	  given	  the	  privacy	  issues	  of	  surveillance	  and	  
the	  challenges	  of	  capturing	  cyber	  criminals	  (AT	  Kearney,	  2015).	  
Risk:	  Data	  Exchange	  and	  Infrastructure	  
The	  rapid	  exchange	  of	  data	  across	  the	  world	  has	  become	  one	  of	  the	  hallmarks	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  
century.	  Given	  its	  central	  role	  in	  contemporary	  economies,	  the	  maintenance	  and	  protection	  of	  
infrastructure	  required	  for	  the	  exchange	  of	  data	  is	  paramount.	  The	  physical	  infrastructure	  of	  data	  
sharing,	  like	  undersea	  cables,	  could	  become	  a	  terrorist	  or	  warfare	  target,	  and	  if	  infrastructure	  is	  
inadequately	  maintained,	  data	  exchange	  could	  be	  compromised	  (WEF	  2016).	  In	  addition	  to	  physical	  
infrastructure,	  international	  legal	  frameworks	  need	  be	  better	  developed	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  unhindered	  
exchange	  of	  data.	  “The	  current	  regulatory	  regime	  is	  underdeveloped	  and	  lacks	  the	  necessary	  legal	  
certainty	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  privacy,	  transparency,	  encryption	  control,	  the	  effect	  of	  intellectual	  property	  
regimes	  on	  data	  that	  cross	  borders,	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  proprietary	  data	  on	  competition”	  (WEF	  2016,	  18).	  	  
Trend:	  Move	  towards	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  
Since	  the	  first	  commercial	  microprocessor	  chip	  was	  built	  in	  1971,	  the	  key	  focus	  in	  computing	  has	  been	  
on	  making	  chips	  smaller	  and	  more	  powerful;	  a	  success	  easily	  visualised	  comparatively––if	  construction	  
and	  architecture	  has	  progressed	  as	  fast	  as	  computing	  since	  1971,	  the	  tallest	  building	  would	  now	  reach	  
half	  way	  to	  the	  moon	  (The	  Economist	  2016b).	  However,	  this	  rapid	  rate	  of	  progress,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  form	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of	  progress,	  has	  now	  changed.	  Advancements	  in	  chips	  have	  slowed,	  since	  there	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  demand	  to	  
make	  it	  smaller	  and	  more	  powerful;	  the	  focus	  in	  computing	  is	  now	  on	  software,	  specialized	  hardware	  
and	  the	  ‘cloud’.	  Hardware	  is	  becoming	  increasingly	  specialized	  by	  industry,	  and	  advances	  in	  the	  ‘cloud’	  
mean	  that	  high	  quality	  internet	  connectivity	  is	  more	  important	  than	  ever	  before.	  	  
Software	  development	  has	  extended	  to	  ‘deep	  learning’	  and	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  (AI)	  is	  progressing	  
rapidly	  (The	  Economist	  2016).	  Significant	  voices	  in	  the	  technology	  and	  science	  community––from	  
Stephen	  Hawking	  to	  Bill	  Gates	  and	  Elon	  Musk––have	  warned	  that	  AI	  is	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  risks	  facing	  
humanity,	  pointing	  to	  job	  threats,	  the	  undermining	  of	  human	  liberty	  with	  the	  potential	  to	  monitor	  
conversations	  and	  face	  recognition	  and	  also	  the	  more	  broadly	  defined	  “threat	  of	  autonomous	  machines	  
with	  superhuman	  cognitive	  capacity	  and	  interests	  that	  conflict	  with	  those	  of	  Homo	  sapiens”	  (The	  
Economist	  2015a).	  However,	  other	  voices	  point	  to	  the	  enormous	  potential	  benefits	  of	  AI	  such	  as	  such	  as	  
advancements	  in	  healthcare	  and	  education,	  and	  increased	  economic	  productivity	  (The	  Economist	  
2015a).	  	  
Trend:	  E-­‐commerce	  
E-­‐Commerce	  is	  already	  a	  well-­‐established	  trend,	  particularly	  in	  advanced	  economies.	  Goldman	  Sachs	  
predicts	  that	  e-­‐commerce	  will	  gain	  greater	  market	  share	  worldwide,	  and	  in	  India,	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  the	  
e-­‐commerce	  sector	  will	  triple	  from	  $23	  billion	  to	  $69	  billion	  by	  2020	  (Overdorf	  2016).	  While	  in	  advanced	  
economies,	  e-­‐commerce	  has	  relied	  on	  existing	  commercial	  and	  logistics	  infrastructure,	  in	  India,	  e-­‐
commerce	  has	  built	  a	  financial	  infrastructure	  with	  innovative	  payment	  methods	  and	  small	  business	  
loans	  and	  is	  attempting	  to	  better	  connect	  rural	  areas	  to	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  economy	  (The	  Economist,	  
2016A)	  
E-­‐commerce	  in	  India	  has	  gained	  a	  large	  market	  share,	  with	  the	  combined	  sales	  of	  the	  top	  three	  e-­‐
commerce	  retailers	  exceeding	  that	  of	  their	  top	  ten	  offline	  counterparts	  (The	  Economist,	  2016A).	  
According	  to	  Amazon,	  6,000	  Indian	  businesses	  are	  now	  retailing	  internationally;	  likewise,	  Chinese	  e-­‐
commerce	  giant	  Alibaba	  has	  connected	  780	  rural	  Chinese	  villages	  to	  online	  retail;	  at	  least	  10%	  of	  
households	  in	  these	  areas	  are	  now	  engaged	  in	  e-­‐commerce	  as	  buyers	  or	  sellers	  (The	  Economist,	  2016A).	  
The	  immense	  success	  of	  e-­‐commerce	  in	  India	  could	  be	  mirrored	  in	  other	  developing	  countries,	  including	  
South	  Africa,	  although	  on	  a	  smaller	  scale.	  This	  would	  impact	  urban	  economies	  and	  spatial	  form,	  
particularly	  as	  offline	  retailers	  face	  increasing	  competition.	  
Trend:	  The	  Increasing	  Digital	  Divide	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One	  of	  the	  key	  social	  issues	  emanating	  from	  improvements	  in	  technology	  is	  the	  rapidly	  increasing	  digital	  
divide,	  where	  some	  (usually	  the	  wealthy	  and	  better	  educated)	  have	  access	  to	  the	  internet	  and	  new	  
forms	  of	  technology,	  while	  others	  are	  omitted	  from	  this	  increasingly	  significant	  aspect	  of	  the	  global	  
economy.	  Exclusion	  from	  ICT	  fosters	  social	  discord	  and	  exacerbates	  inequality.	  Castells	  (2001:	  248)	  
argues	  that	  internet	  access	  is	  “a	  requisite	  for	  overcoming	  inequality	  in	  a	  society	  which	  dominant	  
functions	  and	  social	  groups	  are	  increasingly	  organized	  around	  the	  internet”.	  	  
The	  digital	  divide	  also	  extends	  beyond	  simple	  access	  to	  a	  computer;	  the	  ability	  to	  access	  information,	  
particularly	  that	  behind	  paywalls,	  is	  significant	  (Graham	  and	  Foster,	  2016).	  “An	  overemphasis	  on	  the	  
mere	  presence	  of	  computers	  or	  Internet	  connections,	  without	  a	  corresponding	  emphasis	  on	  social	  
mobilization	  and	  transformation,	  can	  squander	  resources	  while	  leaving	  inequity	  intact	  processes	  that	  
underlie	  social	  development	  and	  inclusion”	  (Warschauer,	  2003:	  303).	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  areas	  of	  
technological	  turbulence	  that	  need	  not	  remain	  uncertain	  as	  government	  intervention	  providing	  
comprehensive	  ICT	  access	  can	  quell	  the	  potential	  social	  ills	  of	  technology	  and	  the	  digital	  divide.	  	  	  
Since	  there	  is	  so	  much	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  field	  of	  technology,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  potential	  
areas	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  impact,	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  against	  such	  eventualities.	  
Economic	  Implications	  
There	  is	  much	  economic	  hope	  invested	  the	  technology	  sector;	  The	  Global	  Risks	  Report	  (WEF	  2016)	  
outlines	  potential	  areas	  of	  economic	  impact	  and	  shows	  that	  new	  technologies	  could	  have	  an	  annual	  
economic	  impact	  of	  between	  16.7	  trillion	  dollars	  and	  40.4	  trillion	  dollars.	  Work	  in	  mobile	  internet,	  cloud	  
technology,	  the	  Internet	  of	  Things,	  and	  the	  automation	  of	  knowledge	  is	  predicted	  to	  have	  the	  highest	  
economic	  impact,	  as	  displayed	  in	  Figure	  5.	  	  
However,	  there	  are	  also	  concerns	  about	  the	  potential	  of	  an	  economic	  ‘bubble’	  bursting	  in	  the	  
technology	  sector,	  similar	  to	  the	  ‘dotcom	  crash’	  of	  2000.	  Although	  contemporary	  technology	  businesses	  
are	  more	  robust,	  the	  industry	  is	  insular	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  Silicon	  Valley’s	  companies	  are	  private	  and	  
funded	  by	  a	  small	  pool	  of	  investors,	  meaning	  little	  public	  accountability	  (The	  Economist	  2015b).	  If	  a	  
‘tech-­‐bubble’	  were	  to	  burst	  in	  Silicon	  Valley,	  it	  could	  have	  global	  economic	  ramifications.	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The	  labour	  market	  could	  also	  be	  changed	  by	  the	  ability	  to	  work	  remotely,	  although	  the	  uptake	  in	  remote	  
work	  has	  been	  lower	  than	  expected,	  with	  most	  firms	  wishing	  for	  their	  employees	  to	  work	  centrally.	  
Upon	  reviewing	  existing	  trends	  it	  seems	  more	  likely	  that	  jobs	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  computerized,	  creating	  
greater	  unemployment,	  especially	  among	  lower-­‐skilled	  workers.	  The	  Global	  Risks	  Report	  (WEF	  2016,	  20)	  
suggests	  “skills	  in	  STEM	  (science,	  technology,	  engineering	  and	  mathematics)	  are	  expected	  to	  increase	  in	  
importance	  in	  the	  medium	  term,	  with	  longer-­‐term	  needs	  projected	  to	  focus	  on	  skills	  such	  as	  creativity,	  
problem-­‐	  solving	  and	  social	  intelligence.”	  Growth	  in	  unemployment	  is	  a	  well-­‐documented	  social	  and	  
political	  issue,	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  job	  losses	  through	  technology	  must	  be	  realized	  and	  combatted.	  	  
Governance	  Challenges	  
Technological	  innovation	  often	  has	  unexpected	  governance	  implications.	  As	  has	  already	  been	  seen	  in	  
Johannesburg,	  Uber	  and	  Airbnb	  have	  been	  difficult	  to	  regulate	  with	  little	  precedent	  for	  such	  
phenomena.	  The	  Uber	  car	  service	  app	  has	  already	  had	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  Johannesburg’s	  
transportation	  network	  and	  causing	  a	  regulatory	  conundrum.	  The	  San-­‐Francisco-­‐based	  company	  has	  
been	  accused	  of	  avoiding	  taxation	  and	  other	  regulation	  in	  South	  Africa	  and	  abroad	  (Gedye,	  2015).	  
Airbnb,	  which	  enables	  people	  to	  rent	  rooms	  in	  private	  homes,	  has	  faced	  disputes	  with	  city	  authorities	  in	  
Berlin,	  New	  York,	  San	  Francisco	  and	  elsewhere,	  with	  Barcelona	  fining	  the	  company	  30,000	  euros	  for	  
violating	  local	  tourism	  laws	  (Kassam,	  2014).	  Unprecedented	  technological	  trends,	  such	  as	  Uber	  and	  
Airbnb,	  speak	  to	  the	  need	  for	  flexible	  regulatory	  systems.	  	  
Figure	  8:	  Estimated	  Potential	  Impact	  of	  Technologies,	  US	  $	  trillion,	  annual	  (WEF,	  2016,	  p.	  18)	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While	  there	  is	  much	  speculation	  about	  the	  future	  of	  technology,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  be	  certain	  of	  what	  
will	  become	  transformative	  in	  society	  and	  what	  will	  falter.	  However,	  there	  are	  three	  vital	  steps	  that	  can	  
be	  taken	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  rapidly	  changing	  field	  of	  technology	  is	  not	  a	  hindrance.	  
1. Be	  aware	  of	  technological	  trends,	  cyber	  threats	  and	  their	  potential.	  
2. Ensure	  that	  systems	  of	  governance	  and	  regulatory	  networks	  adapt	  to	  the	  challenges	  posed	  by	  
technology	  (e.g.	  around	  privacy	  and	  surveillance).	  	  
3. Since	  the	  only	  unquestionable	  variable	  is	  that	  technology	  is	  going	  to	  continue	  to	  play	  a	  massive	  
role	  in	  shaping	  cities	  and	  human	  lives,	  substantial	  efforts	  should	  be	  made	  to	  lessen	  the	  digital	  
divide.	  	  2.6	  Social	  and	  Political	  
The	  nature	  of	  politics	  and	  social	  relations	  has	  changed	  substantially	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century.	  As	  visible	  
in	  news	  reports	  across	  the	  world,	  youth	  social	  movements	  and	  social	  media	  have	  overtaken	  traditional	  
political	  parties	  and	  trade	  unions	  as	  the	  dominant	  forms	  of	  civil	  society	  activism.	  Although	  there	  is	  
rapidly	  declining	  faith	  in	  traditional	  institutions,	  traditional	  institutional	  models	  are	  still	  dominant,	  
leaving	  considerable	  socio-­‐political	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  future	  forms	  of	  activism	  and	  political	  
relationships.	  Widening	  global	  inequality,	  especially	  in	  cities,	  is	  fostering	  social	  unrest,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
increasing	  self-­‐imposed	  isolation	  of	  the	  wealthy	  (UN-­‐Habitat,	  2016).	  The	  WEF’s	  Global	  Risks	  Report	  
(2016)	  highlights	  the	  risk	  of	  social	  instability;	  although	  social	  instability	  can	  result	  in	  positive	  gains,	  the	  
outcomes	  are	  uncertain.	  	  
International	  Movements	  
The	  clash	  of	  institutions	  with	  social	  movements	  and	  the	  general	  mistrust	  of	  institutions	  are	  immensely	  
prominent	  in	  2016.	  “The	  most	  recent	  edition	  of	  the	  Edelman	  Trust	  Barometer	  found	  that	  in	  a	  higher	  
proportion	  of	  the	  surveyed	  countries	  than	  ever	  before	  in	  the	  barometer’s	  15	  year	  history,	  people	  were	  
distrustful	  of	  both	  governments	  and	  businesses”	  (WEF,	  2016).	  NGOs	  were	  not	  as	  strongly	  mistrusted	  as	  
governments,	  but	  faith	  in	  NGOs	  had	  also	  declined	  (WEF,	  2016).	  Globally,	  governments	  are	  perceived	  as	  
unable	  to	  respond	  to	  global	  challenges,	  unwilling	  to	  regulate	  big	  business,	  privileging	  the	  wealthy	  and	  
unaccountable	  to	  citizens	  (WEF,	  2016).	  Regional	  groupings,	  likewise,	  appear	  impotent,	  resulting	  in	  the	  
potential	  exit	  of	  the	  UK	  from	  the	  European	  Union,	  and	  severe	  doubt	  about	  the	  capacity	  of	  regionalism.	  
The	  decline	  in	  support	  for	  labour	  unions	  in	  advanced	  economies	  is	  further	  proof	  that	  traditional	  political	  
structures	  are	  being	  rejected.	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  union	  membership	  has	  hit	  a	  97	  year-­‐low,	  with	  only	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11.3%	  of	  workers	  unionised	  (Liu	  2013).	  This	  trend	  is	  likely	  to	  continue,	  and	  will	  foster	  uncertain	  
outcomes.	  
In	  many	  countries,	  politics	  is	  becoming	  increasingly	  polarised,	  particularly	  by	  an	  extremist	  right	  gaining	  
ground.	  Should	  the	  ultra-­‐right	  wing	  conservatives	  come	  to	  power––such	  as	  UKIP	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  
or,	  most	  pertinently,	  Donald	  Trump	  in	  the	  United	  States––protectionist	  policies	  would	  be	  their	  hallmark,	  
and	  international	  trade,	  especially	  in	  emerging	  economies,	  could	  suffer	  (The	  Economist,	  2016c).	  The	  
growth	  in	  right-­‐wing	  politics	  is	  also	  fuelled	  by	  the	  migrant	  crisis	  resulting	  from	  the	  Syrian	  war	  and	  the	  
increased	  threat	  of	  terrorism	  from	  Islamic	  State.	  These	  provide	  justifications	  for	  increased	  securitisation	  
of	  cities,	  Islamophobia	  and	  racism.	  Hatred	  or	  fear	  of	  the	  ‘other’	  has	  become	  a	  defining	  factor	  in	  
contemporary	  social	  interactions	  and	  political	  discourse;	  especially	  in	  the	  global	  north.	  Islamophobia	  has	  
been	  labelled	  a	  threat	  to	  European	  democracy,	  as	  European	  countries	  become	  increasingly	  authoritarian	  
in	  the	  name	  of	  restricting	  migration	  (Tharoor	  2016).	  
Meanwhile,	  activism	  against	  institutions	  and	  social	  norms	  has	  taken	  new	  forms.	  The	  prevalence	  of	  social	  
media	  has	  created	  a	  new	  brand	  of	  ‘hashtag	  activism’:	  a	  term	  coined	  during	  the	  US	  Occupy	  (Wall	  Street)	  
movement	  to	  describe	  activism	  that	  is	  organised	  or	  conducted	  on	  social	  media	  (Augenbraun	  2011).	  The	  
international	  #blacklivesmatter	  movement	  arose	  in	  response	  to	  the	  institutional	  failure	  of	  the	  American	  
court	  system	  to	  bring	  the	  killers	  of	  young,	  innocent	  black	  men	  to	  justice.	  While	  it	  began	  as	  a	  social	  media	  
campaign,	  the	  #blacklivesmatter	  movement	  has	  been	  labelled	  a	  new	  civil	  rights	  movement,	  achieved	  
concrete	  gains	  in	  the	  US	  and	  made	  international	  headline	  news	  (Day	  2015).	  
Social	  media	  has	  also	  brought	  renewed	  vigour	  to	  the	  issues	  of	  gender	  inequality,	  racism,	  Islamophobia	  
and	  other	  forms	  of	  discrimination.	  The	  politics	  of	  race	  and	  gender	  has	  become	  increasingly	  pronounced.	  
In	  addition	  to	  #blacklivesmatter,	  #MuslimsAreNotTerrorist	  has	  tried	  to	  address	  rampant	  European	  and	  
American	  Islamophobia	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  terrorist	  attacks	  in	  Paris	  (Marans,	  2015).	  #BringBackOurGirls,	  
#WhyIStayed,	  #YesAllWomen	  have	  drawn	  attention	  to	  feminist	  issues	  and	  arguably	  ignited	  a	  growing	  
global	  feminist	  imagination	  (Hossain	  2014).	  
Hashtag	  activism,	  although	  labelled	  ‘slacktivism’	  by	  some,	  should	  not	  be	  underestimated.	  It	  has	  drawn	  
global	  attention	  to	  social	  and	  political	  issues	  and	  many	  hashtag	  movements	  have	  translated	  to	  
substantial	  ‘real	  world’	  gains.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  impactful	  movement	  of	  hashtag	  activism	  enabling	  
collective	  organising	  was	  the	  Arab	  Spring.	  Social	  media	  has	  correlated	  with	  a	  rise	  in	  youth	  political	  
engagement,	  which	  has	  had	  a	  significant	  global	  impact,	  ranging	  from	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  to	  the	  2014	  Hong	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Kong	  protests.	  Recently,	  in	  Brazil,	  youth	  politics	  and	  social	  media	  were	  central	  in	  mobilising	  the	  protests	  
that	  led	  to	  Rousseff’s	  impeachment	  (Winsor	  2016).	  
South	  African	  Movements	  
In	  South	  Africa,	  youth	  activism	  has	  played	  a	  profound	  role	  in	  shaping	  politics	  in	  recent	  years;	  especially	  
since	  the	  #RhodesMustFall	  movement	  began	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Cape	  Town	  in	  March	  2015.	  The	  
following	  #FeesMustFall	  protests	  have	  illustrated	  the	  immense	  power	  underlying	  hashtag	  activism	  and	  
politicised,	  active	  youth.	  Students,	  in	  each	  of	  these	  cases,	  have	  challenged	  the	  institutions	  of	  universities	  
and	  the	  state,	  to	  bring	  about	  concrete	  change.	  The	  reallocation	  of	  government	  spending	  following	  
#FeesMustFall	  has	  created	  additional	  uncertainty	  about	  national	  fiscal	  pressures	  and	  the	  financial	  
sustainability	  of	  South	  African	  universities.	  	  
South	  Africa	  is	  also	  facing	  widening	  inequality,	  growing	  unemployment	  and	  economic	  stagnation,	  all	  of	  
which	  result	  in	  increased	  social	  unrest,	  especially	  among	  unemployed	  or	  underemployed	  youth.	  As	  is	  the	  
global	  case,	  South	  Africans	  have	  lost	  trust	  in	  institutions.	  According	  to	  AfroBarometer,	  a	  public	  attitude	  
survey	  across	  much	  of	  Africa,	  trust	  for	  public	  institutions	  has	  dropped	  dramatically	  since	  2011	  
(Afrobarometer	  2015).	  
Given	  the	  current	  trends	  towards	  hashtag	  activism,	  youth	  social	  movements	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  trust	  in	  
traditional	  institutions,	  institutions	  need	  to	  become	  more	  responsive	  to	  public	  demands,	  engage	  in	  
social	  media	  and	  recognise	  the	  importance	  of	  public	  accountability.	  Given	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  social	  
relations	  and	  political	  power,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  prioritise	  adaptability	  in	  all	  spheres	  and	  highlight	  
accountability.	  2.7	  Implications	  
The	  outline	  of	  trends	  provided	  above	  is	  not	  intended	  to	  be	  comprehensive	  or	  authoritative	  but	  rather	  to	  
be	  indicative	  of	  the	  high	  levels	  of	  uncertainty	  across	  sectors	  of	  concern.	  However,	  it	  does	  suggest	  
implications	  for	  the	  COJ	  as	  outlined	  below:	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• The	  COJ	  should	  progressively	  strengthen	  its	  capacity	  to	  address	  risk,	  including	  through	  
deepening	  its	  understanding	  of	  risk.	  Specifically,	  the	  COJ	  could	  adopt	  at	  city-­‐level	  the	  forms	  of	  
risk	  assessment	  that	  have	  been	  developed	  by	  global	  institutions3.	  
• Take	  the	  shifting	  demographic	  trends	  more	  seriously	  in	  planning	  processes.	  Instead	  of	  assuming	  
the	  continuation	  of	  the	  previous	  trends	  of	  high	  urban	  growth,	  begin	  responding	  to	  a	  possible	  
future	  of	  declining	  urban	  population	  growth	  rates,	  near-­‐saturation	  levels	  of	  urbanisation	  and	  
demographic	  ageing.	  
• Recognise	  the	  potential	  role	  of	  transnational	  migration	  in	  addressing	  future	  demographic	  
challenges	  (and,	  importantly,	  communicate	  positive	  messages	  around	  the	  role	  of	  migration	  to	  
the	  public	  as	  xenophobia	  remains	  a	  major	  threat	  to	  realising	  the	  positive	  benefits	  of	  migration).	  
• Put	  in	  place	  systems	  for	  the	  systematic	  monitoring	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  climate	  change	  in	  
Johannesburg	  and	  its	  wider	  region,	  and	  progressively	  strengthen	  adaptation	  measures.	  
• Progressively	  reduce	  the	  dependence	  of	  the	  city	  on	  both	  carbon-­‐based	  and	  external	  sources	  of	  
energy	  through	  demand	  management,	  increasing	  local	  generation	  of	  energy	  (electricity	  and	  
fuel)	  and	  changing	  energy	  procurement	  practices	  (e.g.	  through	  the	  use	  of	  wheeling	  agreement	  
that	  would	  allow	  access	  to	  IPPs).	  
• Vigorously	  implement	  measures	  to	  delay	  the	  need	  for	  large-­‐scale	  water	  augmentation	  but	  
engage	  energetically	  with	  national	  government	  over	  plans	  to	  ensure	  the	  long-­‐term	  sustainability	  
of	  water	  supply	  for	  the	  city.	  
• In	  this	  period	  of	  economic	  crisis	  across	  all	  geographic	  scales,	  place	  the	  economy,	  and	  especially	  
job	  creation,	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  all	  the	  city	  does.	  Do	  all	  that	  is	  possible	  to	  attract	  the	  inward	  
investment	  that	  addresses	  the	  developmental	  challenges	  of	  the	  city	  and	  to	  unlock	  local	  
entrepreneurialism.	  Increase	  the	  capacity	  for	  economic	  analysis	  and	  especially	  for	  identifying	  
possible	  future	  drivers	  of	  the	  city’s	  economy.	  
• While	  the	  outcomes	  of	  technological	  change	  cannot	  be	  predicted,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  increase	  
capacities	  to	  benefit	  positively	  from	  this	  change	  and	  reducing	  risks	  by	  continual	  monitoring,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3For	  example,	  the	  WEF’s	  annual	  surveys	  of	  short-­‐	  and	  long-­‐term	  risk	  assessments	  that	  draw	  on	  the	  perceptions	  of	  a	  
range	  of	  selected	  experts	  and	  leaders	  across	  segments	  of	  society.	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reform	  and	  adaptation	  of	  regulatory	  frameworks,	  and	  dealing	  proactively	  with	  the	  challenges	  of	  
the	  digital	  divide.	  
• Engage	  with	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  political	  organisation	  and	  social	  organisation,	  and	  the	  
declining	  faith	  in	  formal	  institutions	  by	  expanding	  the	  openness,	  accessibility	  and	  accountability	  
of	  government,	  and	  by	  strengthening	  mechanisms	  of	  communication,	  including	  the	  use	  of	  social	  
media.	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3. Managing	  Uncertainty	  
In	  the	  first	  section	  of	  the	  report	  we	  explored	  multiple	  dimensions	  of	  uncertainty.	  We	  have	  shown	  that	  
there	  are	  emergent	  trends	  to	  explore	  but	  that	  in	  relation	  to	  each	  of	  them	  uncertainties	  are	  vast.	  How	  
then	  do	  we	  plan,	  given	  that	  planning	  would	  seem,	  almost	  by	  definition,	  to	  require	  a	  degree	  of	  
confidence	  around	  knowledge	  of	  the	  future?	  Fortunately,	  there	  is	  some	  guidance	  in	  the	  international	  
literatures,	  although	  with	  very	  different	  positions	  and	  orientations.	  
The	  literature	  on	  responding	  to,	  and	  planning	  for,	  uncertainty	  has	  been	  evolving	  since	  at	  least	  the	  late	  
1960s.	  The	  social	  turbulence	  in	  cities	  in	  North	  America	  and	  Western	  Europe	  challenged	  assumptions	  
around	  stability	  and	  uncertainty	  that	  underpinned	  policy-­‐making	  and	  planning	  in	  the	  politically	  and	  
economically	  dominant	  global	  North	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  era.	  This	  was	  reinforced	  in	  1973	  with	  the	  Global	  Oil	  
Shock	  which	  effectively	  ended	  a	  prolonged	  era	  of	  global	  economic	  stability.	  We	  are	  currently	  in	  a	  period	  
of	  renewed	  uncertainty	  and	  instability	  globally	  which	  is	  redirecting	  attention	  to	  ways	  to	  plan	  without	  
certainty.	  
There	  is	  a	  considerable	  literature	  on	  corporate	  planning	  and	  strategy	  in	  contexts	  of	  uncertainty,	  and	  a	  
lesser	  literature	  on	  planning	  within	  the	  public	  sector.	  There	  is	  an	  especially	  extensive	  recent	  literature	  
on	  adaptive	  governance	  which	  is	  derived	  largely	  from	  work	  on	  responses	  to	  climate	  change,	  but	  has	  
expanded	  into	  addressing	  other	  areas	  of	  uncertainty.	  There	  are	  also	  literatures	  on	  uncertainties	  in	  the	  
production	  environment,	  on	  innovation	  in	  uncertain	  contexts,	  and	  on	  specific	  approaches	  and	  methods	  
such	  as	  foresight	  and	  back-­‐casting.	  
It	  is	  difficult	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  it	  all	  but	  Wiltbank	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  helpfully	  categorised	  the	  different	  
approaches	  to	  dealing	  with	  uncertainty.	  As	  shown	  in	  Figure	  6,	  they	  used	  a	  quadrant-­‐based	  
categorisation	  with	  two	  dimensions	  of	  difference––that	  is,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  prediction	  is	  emphasised	  
and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  actors	  attempt	  to	  control	  the	  future.	  
In	  terms	  of	  prediction,	  at	  the	  one	  extreme	  are	  ‘planning’	  approaches	  that	  emphasise	  the	  accuracy	  of	  
prediction	  but	  there	  are	  also	  ‘visionary’	  approaches	  that	  are	  predicted	  on	  an	  ability	  to	  actively	  shape	  the	  
future	  (and	  are	  therefore	  also	  able	  to	  predict).	  At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  are	  the	  approaches	  
which	  are	  concerned	  with	  adaptation	  or	  incremental	  strategy-­‐making	  which	  assume	  that	  prediction	  is	  
not	  possible	  within	  a	  radically	  uncertain	  environment.	  In	  terms	  of	  control,	  there	  are	  approaches	  which	  
are	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  positioning	  an	  institution	  within	  an	  environment	  shaped	  by	  exogenous	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forces.	  At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  are	  approaches	  that	  are	  concerned	  with	  actively	  attempting	  to	  
shape	  forces	  and	  construct	  futures.	  	  
	  
Wiltbank	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  brought	  these	  two	  dimensions	  together	  to	  in	  identifying	  four	  categories	  of	  
response	  which	  are	  indicated	  in	  Figure	  6	  and	  below:	  
1. Planning	  (high	  prediction,	  low	  control)	  –	  in	  this	  approach	  the	  dominant	  strategy	  is	  “try	  harder	  to	  
predict	  and	  position	  more	  accurately.”	  
2. Adaptive	  (low	  prediction,	  low	  control)	  –	  “move	  faster	  to	  adapt	  to	  a	  rapidly	  changing	  
environment.”	  
3. Visionary	  or	  predictive	  control	  (high	  prediction,	  high	  control)	  –	  “persistently	  build	  your	  clear	  
vision	  of	  a	  valuable	  future.”	  
4. Transformative	  or	  non-­‐predictive	  control	  (low	  prediction,	  high	  control)	  –	  “transform	  current	  
means	  into	  co-­‐created	  goals	  with	  others	  who	  commit	  to	  building	  a	  possible	  future.”	  
Figure	  9:	  Approaches	  to	  Handling	  Uncertainty	  (Wiltbank	  et	  al.,	  2006)	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In	  the	  section	  below	  the	  literatures	  on	  each	  approach	  is	  briefly	  discussed.	  The	  reality	  in	  practice,	  of	  
course,	  is	  that	  institutions	  may	  combine	  approaches,	  or	  adopt	  more	  than	  one	  simultaneously.	  It	  is	  
possible	  to	  draw	  elements	  from	  each	  approach,	  and	  this	  we	  do	  in	  a	  concluding	  sub-­‐section.	  
3.1	  Planning	  
This	  refers	  to	  particular	  approaches	  to	  planning	  that	  are	  highly	  dependent	  on	  projection	  or	  prediction,	  
and	  which	  then	  attempt	  to	  respond	  with	  strategies	  that	  accommodate	  the	  anticipated	  change.	  In	  the	  
field	  of	  land-­‐use	  planning,	  for	  example,	  predictions	  of	  economic	  and	  demographic	  growth	  would	  be	  
translated	  into	  land	  allocations	  for	  industry,	  housing,	  and	  social	  services.	  This	  approach	  has,	  of	  course,	  
been	  notoriously	  unreliable	  with	  very	  few	  examples	  of	  successful	  predictions,	  and	  multiple	  examples	  of	  
under-­‐	  or	  over-­‐supply	  of	  land	  or	  services.	  	  
Given	  the	  widely	  accepted	  critique	  of	  traditional	  forms	  of	  predictive	  planning	  we	  don’t	  spend	  time	  on	  it	  
here.	  We	  refer	  instead	  to	  more	  responsive	  forms	  of	  predictive	  planning	  that	  take	  account	  of	  uncertainty.	  
Most	  important	  are	  the	  corporate	  strategic	  planning	  processes	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  which	  
were	  later	  taken	  up	  in	  public	  sector	  planning	  although	  these	  eventually	  evolved	  into	  ‘visioning’).	  	  
During	  the	  turbulence	  provoked	  by	  the	  oil	  shocks	  of	  the	  1970s,	  both	  rigid	  business	  planning	  and	  an	  
informal	  approach	  of	  intuition	  and	  trial-­‐and-­‐error	  proved	  inadequate	  for	  firms.	  What	  emerged	  was	  a	  
method	  for	  best	  positioning	  a	  firm	  within	  the	  external	  environment.	  One	  of	  the	  more	  popular	  tools	  in	  
this	  approach	  was	  the	  SWOT	  analysis	  which	  identified	  the	  internal	  Strengths	  and	  Weaknesses	  of	  an	  
organisation,	  and	  the	  Opportunities	  and	  Threats	  posed	  by	  the	  (often	  turbulent)	  external	  environment.	  
This	  analysis	  then	  fed	  into	  the	  development	  of	  a	  Strategic	  Plan	  which	  provided	  strategies	  for	  the	  
competitive	  positioning	  of	  the	  firm.	  This	  approach	  was	  taken	  up	  in	  public	  sector	  planning,	  especially	  for	  
large	  cities,	  where	  a	  strong	  thrust	  in	  strategic	  planning	  was	  improving	  the	  competitive	  position	  of	  a	  city.	  
This	  form	  of	  strategic	  planning	  has	  provoked	  a	  considerable	  debate.	  The	  major	  concern	  is	  with	  
consolidating	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  analysis	  into	  an	  actual	  plan	  as	  this	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  dangerously	  
limiting	  in	  the	  context	  of	  extreme	  uncertainty.	  Miller	  and	  Cardinal	  (19941649)	  explained	  that	  these	  
critics	  “maintain	  that	  a	  plan	  channels	  attention	  and	  behaviour	  to	  an	  unacceptable	  degree,	  driving	  out	  
important	  innovations	  that	  are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  plan”.	  Mintzberg	  (1994a)	  wrote	  that	  explicit	  strategies	  
"are	  blinders	  designed	  to	  focus	  direction	  and	  block	  out	  peripheral	  vision”	  (p.184)	  and	  that	  "setting	  
oneself	  on	  a	  predetermined	  course	  in	  unknown	  waters	  is	  the	  perfect	  way	  to	  sail	  straight	  into	  an	  iceberg"	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(p.26).	  Mintzberg	  (1994b)	  argued	  that	  managers	  must	  be	  strategic	  thinkers	  but	  that	  strategic	  planning	  is	  
not	  the	  same	  as	  strategic	  thinking.	  Strategic	  thinkers	  must	  have	  the	  space	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  complexity	  
of	  a	  fluid	  complex	  and	  should	  be	  able	  to	  exercise	  creativity	  and	  use	  intuition	  without	  the	  constraints	  of	  a	  
prior	  plan.	  
Miller	  and	  Cardinal	  (1994)	  suggest	  that	  in	  turbulent,	  unpredictable	  environments	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  
more	  strategic	  analysis	  than	  otherwise.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  need	  for	  more	  thought––more	  planning––around	  
the	  big	  decisions	  that	  are	  needed	  around	  capital	  outlays,	  for	  example.	  Miller	  and	  Cardinal	  reviewed	  the	  
findings	  of	  26	  studies	  of	  strategic	  planning	  in	  firms	  and	  concluded	  that	  active	  use	  of	  strategic	  planning	  
has	  made	  a	  positive	  contribution	  to	  corporate	  success.	  Grant	  (2003494)	  positioned	  himself	  between	  
these	  two	  positions	  suggesting	  that	  the	  various	  studies	  offered	  “inconsistent	  findings.”	  
The	  debate	  was	  heated	  but	  some	  form	  of	  synthesis	  eventually	  emerged.	  Mintzberg	  (1994a	  &	  b)	  
conceded	  a	  role	  for	  planning	  in	  support	  of	  strategic	  thinking.	  He	  referred	  to	  planners	  as	  analysts	  who	  
provide	  crucial	  informal	  to	  the	  strategic	  thinkers––the	  managers––and	  advise	  on	  possible	  strategies.	  
Shalev-­‐Shwartz	  et	  al.	  (2016)	  offer	  an	  approach	  of	  “long	  term	  planning	  by	  short	  term	  prediction.”	  For	  
them,	  planning	  is	  about	  finding	  immediate	  actions	  that	  would	  optimise	  a	  long	  term	  objective.	  Because	  
long-­‐term	  prediction	  is	  impossible	  given	  the	  uncertain	  environment,	  we	  need	  constant	  planning	  of	  
action	  based	  on	  continuous	  short-­‐term	  prediction.	  The	  planned	  actions	  may	  shift	  but	  the	  long-­‐term	  
objective	  remains	  constant.	  	  
Grant	  (2003)	  used	  a	  different	  method.	  Instead	  of	  proposing	  an	  approach,	  he	  considered	  what	  firms	  are	  
actually	  doing	  in	  contexts	  of	  uncertainty.	  He	  indicates	  that	  large	  corporations	  have	  not	  abandoned	  
strategic	  planning	  despite	  the	  now	  widespread	  awareness	  of	  its	  limitations	  and	  pitfalls.	  Instead,	  the	  
practice	  of	  strategic	  planning	  has	  evolved	  in	  quite	  complex	  ways.	  In	  its	  initial	  (1970s)	  form,	  corporate	  
strategic	  planning	  was	  a	  formal,	  rational,	  top-­‐down	  process,	  generally	  managed	  by	  the	  CEO	  of	  a	  firm.	  
Increasingly,	  however,	  strategic	  planning	  has	  become	  less	  formal	  (with	  less	  reliance	  on	  structured	  
methods);	  more	  decentralised	  with	  inputs	  received	  from	  across	  the	  corporation;	  and,	  often,	  with	  
shorter	  time-­‐horizons	  (especially	  where	  markets	  are	  highly	  volatile).	  There	  is	  much	  more	  attention	  now	  
to	  communication	  within	  the	  firm,	  and	  to	  the	  use	  of	  strategic	  planning	  to	  build	  organisational	  
relationships.	  
To	  some	  extent	  these	  changes	  have	  been	  paralleled	  in	  public	  sector	  planning.	  Traditional	  modes	  of	  
predictive	  planning	  have	  been	  sharply	  criticised	  but	  strategic	  forms	  of	  planning,	  which	  offer	  the	  long	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range	  vision	  but	  also	  the	  space	  for	  short-­‐term	  prediction	  and	  adaptive	  action,	  have	  emerged	  as	  a	  
dominant	  feature	  of	  the	  governance	  of	  large	  cities.	  This	  will	  be	  discussed	  under	  the	  heading	  ‘visionary’	  
as	  long-­‐range	  strategic	  plans	  for	  cities	  are	  increasingly	  intention-­‐driven	  and	  not	  simply	  about	  
competitive	  positioning.	  
3.2	  Adaptive	  
This	  approach	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  predictive	  methods,	  but	  rather	  suggests	  the	  formation	  of	  an	  adaptive	  
system	  that	  can	  react	  to	  change	  more	  quickly	  and	  easily.	  The	  focus	  is	  on	  strategies	  that	  can	  enhance	  
adaptive	  capacity	  with	  little,	  if	  any,	  emphasis	  on	  strategic	  intent.	  	  
In	  1980,	  Rosenhead	  argued	  that	  the	  recognition	  of	  uncertainty	  should	  be	  the	  key	  element	  of	  planning	  
and	  that	  planning	  activity	  “should	  keep	  options	  open,	  and	  aim	  at	  a	  loose	  fit	  on	  the	  planned	  for	  activities”	  
(Rosenhead	  1980,	  331).	  He	  spoke	  of	  the	  need	  for	  instruments	  of	  planning	  that	  are	  explicitly	  about	  
achieving	  flexibility	  and	  of	  methods	  of	  planning	  that	  are	  about	  “continuing	  strategic	  choice”	  (Rosenhead	  
1980,	  331).	  Rosenhead’s	  approach	  has	  been	  expanded	  in	  a	  recent	  and	  now	  considerable	  literature	  on	  
adaptive	  governance.	  The	  term	  is	  a	  short-­‐hand	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  collaborative,	  flexible	  and	  learning-­‐based	  
approaches	  to	  governance	  that	  allow	  us	  to	  (i)	  respond	  effectively	  to	  short-­‐term	  shocks,	  (ii)	  anticipate	  
and	  respond	  on	  an	  ongoing	  basis	  to	  longer-­‐term	  shifts	  such	  as	  demographic	  growth	  and	  climate	  change,	  
and	  (iii)	  deal	  effectively	  with	  pre-­‐existing	  challenges	  such	  as	  spatial	  and	  institutional	  fragmentation,	  
urban	  inequality,	  and	  non-­‐sustainable	  growth	  paths.	  Importantly,	  it	  encompasses	  both	  a	  response	  to	  a	  
sudden	  shock	  and	  to	  on-­‐going	  incremental	  changes	  which	  have	  gradual	  cumulative	  effects.	  
The	  theory	  of	  adaptive	  governance	  is	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  complex	  adaptive	  systems:	  a	  scientific	  term	  
that	  refers	  to	  structures	  such	  as	  the	  brain,	  the	  ecosystem,	  the	  cell	  and	  the	  immune	  system;	  in	  non-­‐
biological	  terms,	  it	  can	  make	  reference	  to	  the	  stock	  exchange,	  the	  global	  macroeconomic	  system	  or	  the	  
internet	  (Pereira	  and	  Ruysenaar,	  2012).	  These	  systems	  are	  sufficiently	  complex	  and	  adaptable	  so	  that	  a	  
small	  shock	  would	  have	  almost	  no	  impact	  on	  the	  overall	  system,	  and	  change	  can	  be	  absorbed	  easily.	  
Taking	  its	  cue	  from	  social-­‐ecological	  systems,	  scholars	  of	  environmental	  governance,	  in	  particular,	  have	  
championed	  the	  concept	  of	  adaptive	  governance	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  uncertainty	  and	  complexity	  of	  
challenges	  such	  as	  climate	  change	  (Chaffin	  et	  al.	  2014;	  Birkmann	  et	  al.	  2010).	  They	  argue	  that	  the	  system	  
of	  governance	  should	  be	  sufficiently	  ‘flexible,	  dynamic	  and	  responsive’	  to	  react	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  contexts,	  
unexpected	  feedback	  and	  complex	  change	  (Chaffin	  et	  al.,	  2014).	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Adaptive	  governance	  is	  however	  also	  influenced	  by	  conceptions	  of	  adaptive	  management––a	  field	  that	  
highlights	  the	  need	  for	  continuous	  learning,	  and	  for	  building	  the	  networks	  through	  which	  learning	  
happens.	  What	  is	  important	  here	  is	  the	  recognition	  of	  how	  important	  social	  relationships,	  both	  formal	  
and	  informal,	  are	  in	  ensuring	  adaptive	  capacity.	  
The	  other	  concept	  and	  field	  of	  investigation	  which	  is	  becoming	  increasingly	  important	  is	  ‘innovation’.	  In	  
his	  critique	  of	  strategic	  planning,	  Mintzberg	  (1994109)	  wrote	  ,	  “search	  all	  those	  strategic	  planning	  
diagrams,	  all	  those	  interconnected	  boxes	  that	  supposedly	  give	  you	  strategies,	  and	  nowhere	  will	  you	  find	  
a	  single	  one	  that	  explains	  the	  creative	  act	  of	  synthesizing	  experiences	  into	  a	  novel	  strategy.”	  The	  
concept	  of	  ‘urban	  innovation’	  has	  emerged	  strongly	  post-­‐2008	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  cutting	  down	  on	  the	  
scale	  and	  quality	  of	  services,	  or	  continuing	  to	  spend	  recklessly	  to	  maintain	  political	  support.	  Urban	  
innovation	  requires	  new	  and	  creative	  ways	  of	  improving	  urban	  services	  within	  an	  existing,	  or	  shrinking,	  
resource	  envelope	  (Harrison	  and	  Rubin,	  forthcoming).	  
The	  most	  recent	  literature	  on	  urban	  innovation	  underlines	  the	  ways	  in	  the	  knowledge,	  skills,	  creative	  
capacity,	  experiences,	  and	  resources	  of	  multiple	  actors	  combine	  to	  produce	  innovative	  responses	  to	  
urban	  problems	  (Harrison	  and	  Rubin,	  forthcoming).	  Sørensen	  (20141)	  writes	  that	  “collaboration	  
between	  interdependent	  actors	  [is]	  a	  key	  driver	  of	  innovation.”	  For	  Sørensen,	  the	  learning	  networks	  
within	  government,	  and	  also	  those	  which	  connect	  government	  to	  other	  actors,	  are	  more	  important	  than	  
well	  managed	  government	  hierarchies.	  The	  approaches	  to	  governance	  which	  emerged	  from	  the	  New	  
Public	  Management	  (NPM)	  are	  arguably	  now	  an	  increasing	  hindrance	  to	  adaptation	  and	  innovation.	  
They	  tend	  to	  leave	  the	  executive	  leadership	  of	  local	  government	  isolated	  at	  the	  top	  of	  an	  administrative	  
hierarchy	  and	  prioritise	  performance	  management	  systems	  that	  reward	  compliance	  to	  existing	  
conceptions	  of	  good	  practice,	  rather	  than	  incentivise	  efforts	  to	  invent	  the	  next	  round	  of	  good	  practice	  
(Harrison	  and	  Rubin,	  forthcoming).	  
There	  is	  now	  a	  fairly	  extensive	  literature	  offering	  guidance	  to	  municipalities	  on	  approaches	  to	  adaptive	  
governance.	  This	  literature	  is	  not	  prescriptive,	  indicating	  instead	  that	  each	  city	  has	  to	  work	  out	  its	  own	  
means	  of	  adaption.	  However,	  the	  literature	  is	  clear	  that	  traditional	  understandings	  of	  government	  
cannot	  facilitate	  the	  adaptability	  required	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  uncertainties	  facing	  cities.	  Slow	  
bureaucracies,	  tensions	  across	  spheres	  of	  government,	  and	  the	  traditional	  separation	  of	  government	  
from	  actors	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  civil	  society	  will	  hinder	  the	  ability	  of	  cities	  to	  respond	  to	  
uncertainties	  and	  threats.	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The	  required	  ingredients	  for	  adaptive	  governance	  include:	  
•	   Less	  hierarchical	  and	  institutional	  rigid	  structures	  (i.e.	  more	  polycentric,	  with	  strong	  informal	  
and	  formal	  linkages	  between	  the	  units	  of	  governance),	  
•	   More	  attention	  to	  linkage	  and	  coordination	  across	  the	  scales	  (or	  spheres)	  of	  governance,	  
•	   Co-­‐production	  between	  government	  and	  non-­‐government	  actors;	  
•	   Deliberate	  effort	  to	  incentivise	  a	  culture	  of	  innovation	  with	  support	  for	  constant	  experimental	  
learning	  and	  learning	  feedbacks,	  
•	   Mobilisation	  and	  energisation	  of	  social	  actors	  in	  response	  to	  the	  critical	  challenges	  and	  
uncertainties	  of	  the	  city,	  
•	   Intelligence	  and	  analysis	  of	  trends	  and	  risks	  feeding	  into	  governance	  systems,	  
•	   Strategic	  and	  visionary	  leadership,	  
•	   Appropriate	  and	  consistently	  administered	  legislative	  and	  regulatory	  frameworks,	  and	  
•	   Enabling	  financial	  arrangements	  (Harrison	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  	  
Promoting	  adaptive	  governance	  within	  a	  large	  hierarchy	  means	  confronting	  many	  entrenched	  practices	  
and	  mind	  sets.	  Lampis	  (2013)	  explains,	  for	  example,	  that	  in	  Bogota,	  Colombia,	  city	  officials	  frequently	  
thwarted	  the	  implementation	  of	  adaptive	  governance	  techniques	  to	  combat	  climate	  change.	  She	  argues	  
that	  the	  transformation	  of	  a	  system	  to	  become	  more	  adaptive	  should	  be	  accompanied	  by	  a	  “framework	  
based	  on	  incentives	  and	  obstacles,”	  so	  as	  to	  ensure	  that	  city	  officials	  are	  willing	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  
adaptive	  governance	  initiative.	  
The	  major	  limitation	  of	  an	  adaptive	  approach	  is	  that	  it	  is	  built	  entirely	  on	  responsiveness	  to	  change	  
rather	  than	  any	  attempt	  to	  influence	  change.	  It	  is	  possible,	  for	  example,	  that	  adaption	  may	  merely	  mean	  
adjustments	  that	  allow	  a	  currently	  unsustainable	  or	  unjust	  development	  path	  to	  persist.	  However,	  
recognition	  of	  this	  limitation	  does	  not	  negate	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  powerful	  forces	  operating	  from	  
global	  to	  local	  levels	  that	  are	  far	  beyond	  the	  capacity	  of	  a	  city	  government	  to	  influence,	  and	  that	  
adaptation	  in	  relation	  to	  these	  is	  a	  necessity.	  	  	  
3.3	  Visioning	  
Visioning	  is	  an	  intentional	  process	  and	  in	  this	  sense	  can	  be	  distinguished	  from	  both	  adaptation	  and	  
earlier	  approaches	  to	  strategic	  planning	  which	  were	  simply	  about	  competitive	  positioning.	  It	  is	  an	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approach	  which	  responds	  to	  uncertainty	  by	  providing	  clarity	  of	  intention	  but	  which	  also	  provides	  the	  
necessary	  flexibility	  in	  realising	  the	  intent.	  
The	  famous	  British	  sociologist	  Anthony	  Giddens	  spoke	  of	  a	  ‘utopian	  realism’,	  arguing	  that	  “we	  can	  
envisage	  alternative	  futures	  whose	  very	  propagation	  might	  help	  them	  be	  realised	  (Giddens,	  1990,	  
p.154).	  His	  hope	  is	  that	  an	  imaginative	  construction	  of	  the	  future	  might	  “rebound	  on	  how	  the	  future	  
actually	  develops”	  (p.178).	  In	  other	  words,	  by	  bringing	  new	  possibilities	  for	  the	  future	  within	  the	  realm	  
of	  popular	  imagination	  through	  the	  construction	  of	  vision,	  we	  may	  make	  possible	  what	  otherwise	  might	  
not	  be.	  
The	  intention	  through	  a	  visioning	  process	  is	  to	  create	  a	  compelling	  statement	  of	  what	  the	  future	  might	  
be	  like	  that	  would	  lead	  behaviours	  and	  actions	  in	  the	  present-­‐day.	  Visions	  present	  positive,	  desirable	  
images	  of	  the	  future	  that	  inspire	  us	  to	  act	  in	  ways	  that	  would	  help	  in	  realising	  them.	  Visions,	  however,	  
have	  to	  be	  believable.	  As	  Giddens	  (1990)	  explained,	  to	  work	  they	  cannot	  be	  wild	  fantasies.	  They	  are	  
most	  effective	  when	  they	  are	  based	  on	  the	  possible	  positive	  outcomes	  of	  processes	  that	  are	  already	  
evident.	  In	  this	  sense	  they	  are	  a	  form	  of	  utopian	  realism.	  
From	  the	  1990s	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  cities	  have	  introduced	  visioning	  processes.	  The	  logic	  of	  these	  
has	  been	  described	  by	  Gaffikin	  and	  Morrissey	  (1999,	  p.	  xi):	  
Vision	  planning,	  in	  seeking	  to	  get	  beyond	  land-­‐use	  planning	  and	  zoning	  (the	  traditional	  concerns	  
of	  planning),	  seeks	  to	  dissolve	  old	  demarcations,	  integrating	  the	  various	  dimensions	  to	  ensure	  a	  
holistic	  development.	  It	  looks	  far	  enough	  ahead	  to	  avoid	  the	  immediate	  concerns	  about	  
feasibilities	  such	  as	  cost.	  Such	  considerations	  inhibit	  imaginations	  about	  preferred	  futures	  by	  
emphasising	  the	  current	  limits	  of	  resources,	  agencies,	  or	  the	  dispositions	  of	  key	  actors.	  By	  
contrast	  vision	  planning,	  supported	  by	  an	  informed	  view,	  is	  offering	  more	  of	  a	  blank	  canvas	  to	  
sketch	  from,	  and	  scratch	  the	  shape	  of	  tomorrow’s	  society.	  Thus	  the	  vision	  is	  intended	  to	  be	  free	  
from	  a	  blinkered	  vision	  which	  perceives	  current	  problems	  and	  visions	  to	  be	  largely	  
unchangeable.	  
Gaffikin	  and	  Morrissey	  do	  however	  make	  the	  point,	  as	  Giddens	  made	  earlier,	  that	  the	  vision	  “is	  not	  
simply	  the	  product	  of	  untamed	  imagination	  and	  flights	  of	  fancy.”	  They	  insist	  that	  this	  would	  amount	  to	  
“no	  more	  than	  wishful	  thinking	  at	  best	  or	  authoritarian	  utopianism	  at	  worst”	  and	  visions	  “must	  be	  
influenced	  by	  an	  acute	  understanding	  of	  the	  complex	  forces	  driving	  social	  change.”	  (1999,	  p.	  xi)	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One	  of	  the	  methods	  for	  producing	  visions	  is	  the	  sketching	  of	  possible	  scenarios,	  using	  an	  analysis	  of	  
trends,	  and	  then	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  desired	  alternatives.	  This	  is	  very	  different	  from	  single	  point	  
forecasting.	  Scenario	  selection	  can	  be	  developed	  into	  plans	  through	  a	  process	  of	  backcasting.	  While	  
forecasting	  is	  about	  predicting	  the	  future	  based	  on	  an	  extrapolation	  of	  current	  trends,	  backcasting	  
involves	  sketching	  out	  a	  desirable	  future	  outcome	  and	  then	  identifying	  the	  steps	  that	  are	  needed	  to	  
achieve	  this	  outcome.	  	  	  
Visioning	  exercises	  form	  part	  of	  the	  new	  generation	  of	  strategic	  spatial	  plans	  for	  cities.	  As	  Newman	  
(20081373)	  explains,	  strategic	  spatial	  planning	  “is	  intended	  to	  be	  an	  active	  force	  for	  change.”	  These	  
plans	  are	  almost	  all	  guided	  by	  statements	  of	  strategic	  intent,	  often	  called	  city	  visions.	  But	  they	  also	  
generally	  reflect	  the	  insights	  of	  systematic	  analysis	  of	  current	  realities	  and	  emergent	  and	  established	  
trends.	  They	  are	  strategic	  because	  they	  are	  selective	  in	  focus,	  long-­‐range	  in	  orientation,	  and	  vision-­‐
focussed,	  and	  are	  therefore,	  arguably	  far	  more	  responsive	  to	  traditional	  forms	  of	  spatial	  planning	  
(Albrechts,	  2006).	  
Much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  strategic	  spatial	  planning	  is	  concerned	  with	  how	  vision-­‐directed	  strategic	  plans	  
are	  produced,	  and	  this	  takes	  us	  to	  the	  forth	  quadrant.	  In	  the	  corporate	  sector	  visions	  were	  frequently	  
produced	  by	  the	  senior	  executive	  as	  a	  form	  of	  ‘predictive	  control’.	  In	  some	  city	  governments,	  too,	  
processes	  were	  highly	  technocratic	  although	  the	  need	  for	  buy-­‐in	  across	  a	  range	  of	  actors	  did	  prompt	  
more	  participatory	  process.	  To	  use	  the	  phrase	  introduced	  by	  Gaffikin	  and	  Morissey	  there	  is	  a	  danger	  of	  
“authoritarian	  utopianism”.	  
3.4	  Transformative	  
This	  approach	  is	  transformative	  in	  that	  the	  process	  of	  developing	  conceptions	  of	  the	  future	  allows	  for	  
the	  relationships	  between	  actors	  to	  change.	  It	  is	  about	  building	  the	  diverse	  networks	  that	  ensure	  greater	  
resilience	  into	  the	  future	  as	  much	  as	  it	  is	  about	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  vision.	  In	  this	  approach,	  the	  vision	  
or	  the	  strategy	  is	  emergent	  rather	  than	  imposed.	  
This	  is	  not	  about	  “participation”	  which	  frequently	  involves	  inviting	  other	  actors	  into	  a	  city	  government-­‐
led	  process	  and	  therefore	  maintains	  the	  authority	  of	  government	  in	  defining	  vision	  and	  strategy.	  In	  a	  
genuine	  process	  of	  co-­‐production	  or	  co-­‐creation	  actors	  outside	  the	  planning	  agency	  are	  able	  to	  
meaningfully	  influence	  all	  stages	  of	  the	  visioning	  and	  planning	  process	  including	  in	  the	  way	  issues	  are	  
affected,	  problems	  are	  defined,	  policies	  and	  actions	  are	  shaped,	  and	  implementation	  is	  structured.	  In	  a	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process	  of	  co-­‐creation,	  for	  example,	  there	  would	  be	  sustained	  arenas	  for	  dialogue	  both	  across	  the	  
agencies	  and	  spheres	  of	  government,	  and	  between	  government	  and	  multiple	  other	  actors.	  These	  would	  
not	  simply	  be	  formal	  structure	  of	  interaction	  but	  rather	  spaces	  in	  which	  multiple	  actors	  can	  meaningfully	  
hear	  each	  other	  and	  co-­‐produce	  plans	  on	  how	  urban	  territory	  could	  evolve.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  case,	  for	  example,	  
of	  provincial	  and	  city	  government	  producing	  their	  strategic	  plans	  and	  then	  seeking	  alignment	  between	  
them,	  but	  rather	  of	  co-­‐producing	  a	  plan,	  also	  involving	  other	  key	  actors.	  
In	  the	  field	  of	  strategic	  spatial	  planning,	  this	  approach	  has	  been	  propagated	  by	  writers	  such	  as	  Albrechts	  
and	  Healey.	  They	  envisage	  strategic	  planning	  processes	  bringing	  multiple	  actors	  together	  within	  forums	  
of	  deliberation	  that	  co-­‐create	  alternative	  futures	  (e.g.	  Healey,	  2006;	  Albrechts,	  2013	  &	  2015).	  Albrechts	  
(2015)	  refers	  to	  co-­‐production	  as	  being:	  
grounded	  in	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  complex	  dynamics	  of	  urban	  and	  regional	  relations	  
where	  value	  systems	  can	  be	  articulated,	  local	  and	  scientific	  knowledge	  can	  be	  combined	  on	  an	  
equal	  base,	  shared	  strategic	  conviction	  can	  grow,	  and	  conflicts	  are	  reframed	  in	  a	  less	  
antagonistic	  manner.	  
Healey	  (2006)	  writes	  of	  the	  “mobile,	  dynamic,	  relational	  complexity	  of	  urban	  regions,”	  and	  argues	  that	  a	  
lack	  of	  spatial	  imagination	  draws	  us	  towards	  narrow	  and	  static	  responses	  to	  this	  complexity.	  There	  is	  a	  
strong	  tendency	  in	  government	  to	  narrow	  down	  the	  complexity	  and	  unify	  rather	  than	  developing	  a	  
“multiplex,	  relational	  understanding	  of	  planning”	  (2006).	  For	  Healey	  (2006),	  developing	  new	  spatial	  
imaginations	  through	  this	  more	  transformative	  approach	  “takes	  time—to	  explore,	  to	  think,	  to	  learn,	  to	  
struggle,	  to	  diffuse.”	  However,	  she	  is	  hopeful	  that	  “changes	  evolve	  in	  many	  small	  ways,	  building	  a	  
ground	  of	  understanding	  and	  experiences	  which,	  over	  time,	  eventually	  come	  together	  in	  what	  history	  
may	  then	  describe	  as	  a	  “transformative	  moment”	  (Healey	  2006,	  540).	  
This	  approach,	  of	  course,	  does	  not	  easily	  fit	  with	  the	  pressures	  of	  government	  where	  timeframes	  are	  
important,	  and	  where	  planning	  cycles	  and	  performance	  management	  systems	  predominate.	  It	  requires	  
willingness	  on	  the	  part	  of	  government	  to	  accept	  open	  endedness	  in	  terms	  of	  timeframes,	  process,	  
problem	  definitions	  and	  outcomes,	  and	  to	  cede	  a	  degree	  of	  authority	  for	  plan-­‐making.	  For	  Healey,	  many	  
of	  the	  opportunities	  arise	  in	  tensions,	  stresses,	  fissures	  and	  cracks	  in	  governance	  processes	  which	  are	  
also	  difficult	  for	  planning	  agencies	  to	  embrace	  given	  government’s	  aversion	  to	  conflict	  and	  potentially	  
risky	  situations.	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Healey	  does	  ask	  whether	  it	  is	  all	  an	  “impossible	  venture”	  but	  she	  nevertheless	  finds	  hopeful	  examples	  in	  
various	  cases	  across	  Europe.	  She	  acknowledges,	  however,	  the	  enormous	  effort	  required	  given	  the	  ways	  
in	  which	  government	  is	  organised	  across	  scales	  and	  in	  sector	  silos;	  the	  skills	  and	  relational	  capacities	  
needed;	  and,	  the	  ever-­‐present	  threat	  of	  dominant	  interests	  or	  discourses	  taking	  over	  processes.	  
Newman	  (2008)	  is	  rather	  more	  sceptical	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  government	  institutions	  can	  sustain	  the	  
enormous	  complexities	  of	  a	  genuinely	  collective	  endeavour	  which	  crosses	  scales	  and	  sectors.	  He	  
suggests	  that	  Albrechts	  and	  Healey	  have	  provided	  scant	  evidence	  of	  a	  transformative	  strategic	  spatial	  
planning	  in	  practice	  and	  that	  we	  may	  be	  “shifting	  our	  gaze	  too	  far	  from	  the	  current	  realities	  of	  planning	  
practice”	  (1372).	  He	  points	  to	  the	  slow	  pace	  of	  institutional	  development,	  the	  way	  agents	  of	  government	  
constantly	  compete	  to	  carve	  out	  their	  spheres	  of	  influence,	  and	  the	  constant	  realities	  of	  everyday	  
politics.	  He	  suggests	  it	  is	  the	  “ordinary	  politics	  of	  planning	  that	  may	  need	  more	  attention	  than	  the	  
grander	  expectations	  of	  strategic	  spatial	  planning”	  (p.1373).	  
Newman	  (2008)	  argues	  for	  a	  more	  limited	  ambition	  focussed	  around	  specific	  moments	  of	  opportunity	  
rooted	  in	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  political	  process	  within	  which	  government	  officials	  are	  embedded.	  For	  
Newman,	  the	  apparent	  inadequacies	  of	  planning	  are	  not	  a	  case	  of	  planners	  failing	  to	  achieve	  the	  grand	  
ideal	  of	  co-­‐produced	  strategic	  spatial	  planning,	  but	  should	  rather	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  “normal	  
outcome	  of	  multiple	  decisions,	  reflecting	  multiple	  interests,	  strivings	  for	  legitimacy	  and	  responses	  to	  
opportunities	  and	  constraints”(p.1381).	  
Again,	  we	  may	  find	  a	  useful	  synthesis	  of	  positions.	  Albrechts	  and	  Healey	  have	  offered	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  
practice	  of	  strategic	  spatial	  planning	  that	  is	  more	  transformative	  than	  city-­‐led	  visioning	  processes,	  but	  
Newman	  has	  grounded	  us	  in	  the	  realities	  of	  governance,	  suggesting	  more	  modest	  and	  incremental	  
ambitions.	  The	  common	  ground	  may	  be	  a	  commitment	  to	  taking	  strategic	  planning	  in	  a	  more	  
transformative	  direction,	  deliberately	  building	  the	  capacities	  and	  platforms	  to	  achieve	  more	  over	  time.	  
3.5	  Bringing	  the	  Elements	  Together	  
The	  risk	  with	  the	  categorisation	  provided	  by	  Wiltbank	  et	  al.	  is	  that	  we	  may	  be	  forced	  into	  either-­‐or	  
choices	  in	  terms	  of	  responses.	  The	  reality	  is	  that	  while	  we	  may	  aspire,	  for	  example,	  to	  the	  
transformative	  approach	  associated	  with	  processes	  of	  co-­‐creation,	  elements	  of	  other	  approaches	  may	  
be	  necessary.	  Brinckmann	  et	  al.	  (2010),	  for	  example,	  call	  for	  a	  “a	  concomitant	  and	  dynamic	  approach	  
that	  combines	  planning	  and	  learning.”	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We	  may	  conclude	  that	  a	  mix	  of	  planning,	  adaptation,	  visioning,	  and	  transformative	  co-­‐production	  is	  
required	  of	  a	  city	  administration	  acting	  within	  a	  hugely	  complex	  and	  uncertain	  environment.	  We	  need	  to	  
be	  quick	  and	  nimble	  but	  also	  strategically	  informed,	  visionary,	  and	  collaborative	  in	  our	  approaches.	  The	  
challenge	  is	  framing	  the	  balance	  in	  this	  mix.	  Recent	  literature	  suggests	  the	  following:	  	  
• The	  focus	  should	  be	  on	  developing	  the	  capacity	  for	  on-­‐going	  strategic	  thinking,	  but	  strategic	  
thinking	  must	  be	  continually	  informed	  by	  strong	  strategic	  analysis.	  
• There	  is	  nevertheless	  a	  critical	  role	  for	  strategic	  plans	  especially	  for	  city	  government,	  which	  must	  
make	  big	  decisions	  around	  large	  investments	  that	  provide	  path	  dependencies	  into	  the	  future.	  
• These	  strategic	  plans	  must	  have	  robust	  long	  term	  objectives	  informed	  by	  desired	  futures,	  but	  
should	  not	  be	  descriptive	  in	  terms	  of	  actions,	  leaving	  open	  the	  space	  for	  continual	  action-­‐based	  
planning	  informed	  by	  short-­‐term	  predictions.	  
• The	  mode	  of	  strategic	  planning	  may	  need	  to	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  top-­‐down	  (‘central	  strategy’)	  
model	  to	  a	  more	  decentralised	  model	  which	  draws	  in	  inputs	  from	  across	  the	  organisation,	  and	  
which	  uses	  the	  strategising	  process	  to	  build	  organisational	  relationships.	  
• Explicit	  attention	  is	  required	  to	  incentivise	  a	  culture	  of	  adaptation	  and	  innovation	  within	  city	  
government,	  and	  build	  the	  learning	  networks	  within	  the	  administration,	  and	  with	  actors	  beyond	  
the	  administration.	  
• We	  must	  build	  alternative	  narratives	  of	  the	  future	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  our	  imaginings	  will	  rebound	  
on	  how	  the	  future	  actually	  happens.	  
• Visioning	  processes	  should	  involve	  creative	  imagining	  of	  alternative	  futures	  but	  should	  be	  
grounded	  in	  an	  understanding	  of	  possible	  outcomes	  of	  established	  and	  emergent	  trends.	  
• Processes	  of	  co-­‐production	  should	  be	  systematically	  extended	  with	  institutional	  and	  political	  
boundaries	  continually	  tested	  in	  this	  regard,	  but	  nevertheless	  with	  an	  understanding	  of	  
institutional	  realities	  and	  the	  “ordinary	  politics	  of	  planning”.	  
• Within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  complex	  city-­‐region,	  specific	  attention	  is	  needed	  to	  building	  networks	  
and	  relationships	  across	  spheres	  of	  governance,	  and	  to	  developing	  processes	  of	  co-­‐creation	  with	  
the	  other	  spheres	  (and	  with	  neighbouring	  municipalities).	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• To	  support	  all	  the	  proposals	  above,	  specific	  on-­‐going	  attention	  is	  needed	  to	  improve	  the	  
competency,	  dispositions	  and	  knowledge	  (‘intelligence’)	  required	  to	  support	  the	  required	  
response	  to	  change	  and	  uncertainty.	  
	  
None	  of	  this	  is	  simple	  and	  intelligent	  assessment	  is	  continually	  required.	  Courtney	  et	  al.	  (1997),	  for	  
example,	  suggest	  that	  the	  approaches	  taken	  should	  follow	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  actual	  level	  of	  
uncertainty.	  They	  refer	  to	  four	  levels	  of	  uncertainty	  as	  represented	  in	  Figure	  7	  and	  described	  below:	  
Level	  One:	  In	  this	  case	  the	  uncertainty	  exists	  not	  because	  the	  trends	  are	  unknowable	  but	  
because	  the	  strategic	  analysis	  has	  not	  been	  done.	  Here	  there	  is	  room	  for	  fairly	  standard	  
approaches	  to	  strategy	  formulation.	  
Level	  Two	  –	  Here	  there	  may	  be	  two	  or	  more	  discrete	  alternate	  outcomes	  dependent	  on	  clearly	  
defined	  variables	  (for	  example,	  whether	  a	  city	  government	  makes	  a	  decision	  to	  invest	  in	  
broadband	  infrastructure).This	  is	  a	  form	  of	  uncertainty	  best	  suited	  to	  scenario-­‐type	  analysis,	  
and	  to	  the	  use	  of	  probabilities	  in	  assessing	  possible	  outcomes4.	  
Level	  Three:	  There	  is	  a	  range	  of	  possible	  outcomes	  that	  will	  be	  shaped	  by	  a	  number	  of	  
identifiable	  variables.	  There	  may	  not	  be	  any	  natural	  or	  easily	  defined	  scenarios,	  but	  there	  is	  still	  
value	  in	  using	  scenario	  planning	  to	  elaborate	  a	  range	  of	  possible	  outcomes,	  and	  establish	  the	  
risks	  in	  following	  one	  path	  rather	  than	  another.	  	  
Level	  Four:	  This	  is	  a	  position	  of	  true	  ambiguity	  where	  there	  are	  multiple,	  interacting	  dimensions	  
of	  uncertainty	  that	  are	  impossible	  to	  predict	  with	  a	  range	  of	  possible	  outcomes	  that	  cannot	  
even	  be	  identified.	  A	  more	  flexible	  and	  qualitative	  approach	  is	  needed	  here	  but	  Courtney	  et	  al.	  
(199772)	  advise	  that	  “it	  is	  critical	  to	  avoid	  the	  urge	  to	  throw	  up	  your	  hands	  and	  act	  purely	  on	  
gut	  instinct.”	  Managers	  need	  to	  differentiate	  between	  what	  is	  unknowable	  and	  knowable,	  and	  
at	  least	  develop	  analysis	  for	  sub-­‐sets	  of	  information,	  gaining	  strategic	  insight	  from	  indicators	  
and	  other	  signals	  of	  change.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4In	  scenario	  building	  it	  is	  important	  not	  simply	  to	  predict	  the	  possible	  outcomes	  but	  also	  identify	  actions	  to	  reach	  
alternative	  futures,	  and	  identify	  the	  triggers	  which	  will	  indicate	  which	  scenario	  path	  is	  evolving.	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It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  even	  in	  cases	  of	  most	  extreme	  uncertainty	  (level	  four)	  Courtney	  et	  al.	  
acknowledge	  the	  importance	  of	  careful,	  strategic	  analysis.	  While	  no	  amount	  of	  good	  analysis	  will	  
enable	  us	  to	  predict	  the	  future,	  good	  analysis	  does,	  on	  balance,	  lead	  to	  better	  decision-­‐making.	  
	  
	   	  
Figure	  10:	  Levels	  of	  Uncertainty	  Informing	  Strategic	  Responses	  (Courtney	  
et	  al,	  1997)	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4. Comments	  on	  Joburg	  2040:	  Growth	  and	  Development	  Strategy	  
4.1	  On	  the	  Right	  Track	  
The	  Growth	  and	  Development	  Strategy	  (GDS)	  is	  a	  statement	  of	  vision	  and	  intent,	  with	  strategies	  and	  a	  
framework	  for	  implementation.	  It	  is	  clearly	  strategic	  in	  orientation.	  As	  stated	  within	  the	  document	  itself:	  
The	  GDS	  therefore	  frames	  the	  IDP	  [Integrated	  Development	  Plan],	  charting	  long-­‐term	  ambitions,	  
strategies	  and	  overarching	  decisions	  relating	  to	  prioritised	  areas	  of	  focus”	  (GDS,	  2011:	  5)	  
The	  GDS	  states	  clearly	  the	  role	  of	  long-­‐range	  strategic	  planning.	  It	  refers	  to:	  
•	  Pragmatically	  confronting	  complex	  challenges	  and	  defining	  long-­‐term	  strategic	  choices;	  
•	  Framing	  medium-­‐term	  operational	  plans;	  	  
•	  Allowing	  for	  the	  timeous	  conceptualisation	  and	  initiation	  of	  projects	  that	  require	  extensive	  
lead	  times	  and	  long-­‐term	  development;	  
•	  Linking	  long-­‐term	  citywide	  outcomes	  with	  operational	  outputs;	  and	  	  
•	  Stimulating	  public	  interest	  in	  and	  action	  towards	  agreed	  and	  commonly	  held	  future	  
outcomes.	  (GDS,	  2011:	  7)	  
In	  this	  respect,	  the	  COJ	  is	  already	  meeting	  many	  of	  the	  recognised	  requirements	  for	  responding	  to	  
uncertainty.	  The	  GDS	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  adaptation	  to	  identified	  trends,	  and	  an	  intentional	  attempt	  to	  
shape	  these	  trends	  towards	  better	  urban	  futures.	  The	  vision	  is	  of:	  
Johannesburg––a	  World	  Class	  African	  City	  of	  the	  Future––a	  vibrant,	  equitable	  African	  city,	  
strengthened	  through	  its	  diversity;	  a	  city	  that	  provides	  real	  quality	  of	  life;	  a	  city	  that	  provides	  
sustainability	  for	  all	  its	  citizens;	  a	  resilient	  and	  adaptive	  society.	  (GDS,	  2011)	  
While	  emphasising	  vision,	  the	  GDS	  also	  stresses	  the	  importance	  of	  adaptation:	  
The	  changing	  paradigm	  means	  that	  the	  City	  of	  Johannesburg	  has	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  embrace	  
uncertainty.	  To	  cope	  with	  these	  drivers	  of	  change,	  the	  City	  must	  build	  its	  adaptive	  capacity,	  
ensuring	  it	  is	  more	  resilient	  to	  change	  and	  more	  adept	  at	  seizing	  opportunities	  as	  they	  arise.	  
(GDS,	  2011:	  8)	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The	  introduction	  specifically	  frames	  the	  GDS	  as	  a	  response	  to	  uncertainty.	  It	  is	  titled	  “City	  strategies	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  a	  rapidly	  changing	  reality.”	  There	  is	  an	  understanding	  also	  that	  we	  need	  to	  balance	  
adaptation	  with	  the	  need	  for	  clear	  direction	  and	  robustness	  in	  policy:	  
In	  this	  context,	  city	  strategies	  must	  navigate	  the	  uncomfortable	  tension	  between	  defining	  a	  
chosen	  development	  growth	  path,	  and	  accommodating	  uncertainty.	  The	  current	  context	  
reinforces	  the	  notion	  that	  city	  development	  is	  not	  a	  linear	  process––and	  that	  change	  itself	  is	  
never	  linear.	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  develop	  an	  open	  ended	  and	  holistic	  city	  strategy	  that	  
provides	  a	  ‘rough	  consensus’	  of	  strategic	  choices,	  to	  guide	  future	  development.	  Strategies	  of	  this	  
nature	  can	  then	  meaningfully	  inform	  a	  range	  of	  long-­‐term	  strategic	  plans	  and	  programmes.	  (GDS,	  
2011:	  7)	  
The	  tension	  is	  however	  not	  quite	  as	  clear	  as	  suggested	  in	  the	  GDS.	  Having	  a	  chosen	  direction	  is	  not	  
necessarily	  in	  tension	  with	  accommodating	  uncertainty	  but	  is,	  in	  fact,	  a	  key	  strategy	  in	  handling	  
uncertainty.	  The	  tension	  exists	  between	  purely	  adaptive	  and	  purely	  visionary	  responses	  but	  the	  GDS	  has	  
handled	  the	  mix	  well.	  
Through	  a	  layering	  of	  strategic	  and	  operational	  document,	  the	  GDS	  is	  linked	  to	  more	  detailed	  shorter-­‐
term	  terms.	  It	  sets	  the	  strategic	  direction	  for	  the	  medium-­‐term	  IDP	  and	  shorter-­‐term	  business	  and	  
operational	  plans.	  In	  this	  respect,	  it	  maintains	  its	  strategic	  orientation	  and	  avoids	  being	  entangled	  in	  
detail,	  and	  falling	  into	  the	  trap	  of	  prediction.	  With	  the	  revision	  every	  five	  years	  there	  is	  an	  opportunity	  to	  
respect	  to	  unanticipated	  change	  (although	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  GDS	  is	  rewritten	  is	  debateable	  as	  
robustness	  of	  vision	  and	  strategy	  is	  also	  important).	  
The	  GDS	  also	  recognises	  key	  drivers	  of	  uncertainty	  including	  ‘migration’,	  ‘globalisation’,	  ‘climate	  change’,	  
‘natural	  resource	  scarcity’,	  ‘technological	  innovation’	  and	  ‘inequality’,	  providing	  a	  brief	  description	  of	  
each.	  Deeper	  into	  the	  report	  it	  also	  deals	  with	  key	  contributors	  to	  the	  shifting	  global	  context	  which	  it	  
identified	  as	  the	  ‘global	  financial	  downturn’,	  ‘shifting	  geo-­‐politics’,	  ‘climate	  change’,	  ‘global	  population	  
growth	  and	  natural	  resource	  protection’	  and	  ‘the	  global	  network	  revolution	  and	  impact	  of	  social	  
movements’.	  The	  GDS	  does	  not	  claim	  to	  be	  comprehensive	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  analysis	  but	  it	  has	  covered	  
many	  of	  the	  key	  trends	  and	  risk	  (as	  were	  evident	  in	  2011,	  at	  least).	  
The	  preparation	  of	  the	  GDS	  (2011)	  was	  significantly	  more	  participatory	  than	  previous	  version	  of	  long-­‐
range	  planning	  for	  Johannesburg.	  There	  was	  a	  nine	  week	  process	  of	  structured	  engagement	  leading	  to	  
the	  preparation	  of	  the	  GDS	  which	  is	  detailed	  in	  the	  chapter	  entitled	  “Listening	  to	  our	  people’s	  voices”.	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It	  is	  clear	  that,	  in	  many	  respects,	  the	  GDS	  is	  on	  the	  right	  track	  in	  terms	  of	  handling	  uncertainty	  and	  that	  
our	  strongest	  advice	  for	  the	  next	  round	  of	  strategy	  formulation	  is	  to	  continue	  on	  this	  track,	  
strengthening,	  elaborating	  and	  fine-­‐tuning	  the	  approaches.	  There	  are,	  however,	  some	  concerns	  which	  
we	  indicate	  below.	  	  
4.2	  Some	  Concerns	  
The	  first	  concern	  relates	  to	  the	  element	  of	  co-­‐production	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  GDS	  has	  
transformed	  organisational	  and	  societal	  relations	  in	  its	  construction.	  While	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  GDS	  
has	  been	  participatory,	  it	  has	  not	  approached	  ideals	  of	  co-­‐production.	  The	  highly	  structured	  nine-­‐week	  
process	  is	  very	  different	  from	  a	  gradual,	  emergent	  process	  of	  co-­‐production	  in	  which	  the	  city	  allows	  
other	  actors	  to	  play	  key	  roles	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  planning	  starting	  with	  problem	  definitions,	  and	  in	  
which	  forums	  of	  dialogue	  surface	  tensions	  and	  interests	  in	  an	  agonistic	  (as	  opposed	  to	  antagonistic)	  
way.	  It	  is	  our	  view	  that	  institutional	  and	  political	  boundaries	  can	  be	  stretched	  further	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  
co-­‐production	  while	  being	  mindful	  of	  institutional	  and	  political	  realities.	  
In	  the	  complex	  city-­‐region	  of	  which	  Johannesburg	  is	  a	  part	  there	  is	  particularly	  important	  issue	  around	  
multi-­‐scalar	  governance.	  The	  GDS	  does	  indeed	  recognise	  this:	  
Rather	  than	  develop	  a	  blueprint	  plan	  for	  the	  future,	  the	  Joburg	  2040	  GDS	  lays	  the	  foundation	  for	  multi-­‐
level,	  multi-­‐scalar	  and	  integrated	  responses	  to	  the	  challenges	  the	  city	  faces.	  (GDS,	  2011:	  9)	  
However,	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  process	  and	  content	  the	  GDS	  falls	  short	  in	  this	  area.	  The	  dominant	  model	  if	  
still	  of	  city-­‐wide	  and	  provincial	  strategies	  which	  are	  prepared	  mainly	  separately,	  although	  with	  some	  
attempts	  to	  ensure	  formal	  alignment,	  at	  least.	  A	  cross-­‐scalar	  process	  of	  co-­‐production	  in	  which	  the	  
visions	  and	  tensions	  across	  scales	  are	  brought	  into	  a	  meaningful	  dialogue	  is	  still	  some	  way	  off.	  
A	  second	  broad	  area	  of	  concern	  relates	  to	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  implementation	  framework.	  It	  is,	  of	  
course,	  not	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  GDS	  to	  specify	  the	  details	  of	  implementation,	  but	  it	  is	  important	  that	  the	  
approach	  to	  implementation	  is	  well	  framed.	  We	  note	  that	  many	  of	  the	  indicators	  and	  targets	  have	  been	  
left	  vague	  or	  are	  still	  unspecified.	  These	  are	  important	  in	  giving	  guidance	  to	  actors	  across	  the	  city	  
administration	  and	  in	  improving	  the	  accountability	  of	  the	  city	  administration	  to	  its	  citizens.	  
Thirdly,	  there	  are	  a	  few	  issues	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  substantive	  content	  of	  the	  plan––at	  least	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
way	  it	  addresses	  key	  elements	  of	  uncertainty.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  obvious	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  economy.	  The	  
GDS	  does	  address	  economic	  issues,	  providing	  also	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  structure	  and	  relative	  growth	  of	  the	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city	  economy.	  However,	  given	  the	  enormous	  significance	  of	  this	  issue,	  a	  far	  deeper	  analysis	  of	  the	  
drivers	  of	  the	  urban	  economy	  is	  required,	  as	  well	  as	  clearer	  responses	  to	  the	  economic	  challenge.	  The	  
GDS	  was	  prepared	  in	  2011	  at	  a	  time	  when	  there	  was	  hope	  of	  a	  robust	  recovery	  from	  the	  global	  financial	  
crisis.	  The	  recovery	  has	  been	  weaker	  and	  more	  erratic	  than	  expected,	  and	  has	  also	  seen	  deterioration	  in	  
the	  position	  of	  emerging	  economies.	  A	  GDS	  prepared	  in	  2016	  would	  need	  to	  profile	  economic	  issues	  far	  
more	  strongly	  than	  the	  existing	  GDS	  has	  done.	  
All	  other	  areas,	  of	  course,	  require	  some	  updating	  given	  trends	  that	  have	  become	  more	  apparent	  since	  
2011,	  but	  we	  don’t	  detail	  these	  here.	  The	  response	  to	  demographic	  change,	  for	  example,	  requires	  some	  
attention.	  The	  dominant	  narrative	  is	  still	  of	  rapid	  growth	  and	  urbanisation,	  without	  consideration	  to	  a	  
future	  of	  reduced	  growth	  and	  demographic	  ageing.	  The	  GDS	  (2011)	  was	  prepared	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  
Arab	  Spring	  including	  the	  rise	  in	  South	  Africa	  of	  popular	  movements	  that	  have	  been	  labelled	  “hashtag	  
activism”.	  The	  implications	  of	  the	  decreasing	  interest	  of	  the	  youth	  in	  traditional	  forms	  of	  political	  
formation,	  such	  as	  political	  parties,	  and	  their	  growing	  involvement	  in	  issue-­‐based	  movement	  arguably	  
requires	  deeper	  reflection	  and	  a	  strategic	  response	  from	  the	  city	  administration.	  Similar	  points	  may	  be	  
made	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  areas	  of	  concern	  where	  the	  issues	  were	  recognised	  in	  2011	  but	  where	  trends	  
have	  evolved	  or	  new	  insight	  has	  emerged.	  	  
Finally,	  a	  GDS	  could	  give	  more	  attention	  to	  the	  institutional	  requirements	  for	  building	  a	  city,	  and	  a	  city	  
administration,	  that	  is	  resilient	  to	  both	  change	  and	  transformative.	  What	  is	  required	  to	  build	  the	  
necessary	  database,	  gather	  intelligence,	  and	  produce	  the	  required	  high-­‐level	  analysis	  to	  inform	  not	  only	  
the	  next	  GDS	  but	  also	  the	  on-­‐going	  requirement	  of	  strategic	  thinking	  and	  decision-­‐making?	  Also,	  what	  is	  
required	  to	  incentivise	  the	  city	  administration	  to	  be	  more	  strategic,	  innovative,	  adaptive	  and	  
transformative?	  
5. Recommendations	  
Our	  recommendations	  are	  brief	  and	  follow	  from	  our	  assessment	  of	  the	  GDS	  (2011).	  The	  primary	  
recommendation	  is,	  indeed,	  to	  continue	  on	  the	  broad	  direction	  of	  strategic	  planning,	  periodically	  
assessed,	  that	  the	  COJ	  has	  set	  itself	  to	  do.	  
In	  addition	  to	  this,	  however,	  we	  have	  the	  following	  recommendations:	  
1. Strengthen	  assessment	  of	  risk,	  and	  mechanisms	  to	  respond	  to	  risks	  (e.g.	  contingency	  plans,	  early	  
warning	  systems,	  data	  storage,	  redundancy	  in	  infrastructure)	  giving	  consideration	  to	  a	  local	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version	  of	  the	  sort	  of	  global	  risk	  assessment	  undertaken	  by	  international	  agencies	  such	  as	  the	  
WEF.	  	  
2. Take	  the	  shifting	  demographic	  trends	  more	  seriously	  in	  planning	  processes,	  responding	  to	  
probable	  new	  demographic	  trends	  such	  as	  reduced	  growth	  rates	  and	  ageing	  demographics,	  and	  
continuing	  the	  current	  positive	  approach	  towards	  the	  role	  of	  migration.	  
3. In	  this	  period	  of	  economic	  crisis	  across	  all	  geographic	  scales,	  place	  the	  economy,	  and	  especially	  
job	  creation	  and	  livelihood	  support,	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  strategic	  planning	  and,	  indeed,	  at	  the	  heart	  
of	  all	  the	  city	  does.	  
4. Engage	  deeply	  with	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  social	  mobilisation	  and	  political	  formation,	  
emphasising	  the	  openness,	  accountability	  and	  accessibility	  of	  city	  government.	  
5. Maintain	  the	  strong	  strategic	  focus	  on	  climate	  change	  adaptation	  and	  resource	  efficiency,	  
implementing	  with	  urgency	  measures	  to	  improve	  water,	  energy	  and	  food	  security,	  with	  active	  
efforts	  to	  reduce	  external	  dependencies	  or	  ensure	  that	  external	  agents	  are	  planning	  and	  
implementing	  timeously	  to	  protect	  the	  urban	  future.	  
6. Consider	  shifting	  the	  model	  of	  strategic	  planning	  away	  from	  the	  top	  down	  mode	  to	  a	  more	  
decentralised	  approach	  which	  draws	  in	  inputs	  from	  across	  the	  organisation,	  and	  actively	  uses	  
the	  strategising	  process	  to	  build	  organisational	  relationships.	  
7. Give	  explicit	  attention	  to	  the	  requirements	  for	  building	  a	  culture	  of	  adaptation	  and	  innovation	  
within	  city	  government	  (which	  may	  require	  incentives,	  regulatory	  changes,	  changes	  to	  
performance	  management,	  less	  hierarchical	  and	  more	  networked	  structures,	  and	  so	  forth).	  
8. Push	  institutional	  and	  political	  boundaries	  towards	  the	  ideals	  of	  co-­‐production	  in	  strategic	  
planning	  which	  may	  require	  longer	  timeframes,	  more	  energy	  in	  engagement,	  new	  arenas	  for	  
dialogue,	  and	  more	  open-­‐endedness	  in	  expectations.	  
9. Pay	  particular	  attention	  to	  other	  spheres	  of	  government	  and	  neighbouring	  municipalities	  both	  in	  
the	  process	  of	  developing	  plans	  and	  in	  substantive	  content.	  
10. Actively	  build	  the	  capacities	  for	  strategic	  planning	  (e.g.	  in	  terms	  of	  data,	  intelligence,	  analytical	  
capacity,	  and	  monitoring	  and	  evaluation).	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